Communist Party of Kampuchea Policies on Class and on Dealing with Enemies Among the People and Within the Revolutionary Ranks, 1960-1979: Centre, Districts and Grassroots

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This paper reviews overt, declaratory Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) policies regarding class and the treatment of enemies as presented in contemporaneous official Party journals, radio broadcasts and other Party documents. It also covers ex-post facto assertions about those policies as presented by former Party Central Committee Deputy Secretary Nuon Chea in his testimony to the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and some other court testimony. The first section of the paper deals with general policies applicable nationwide. The second looks at these policies as they were articulated with regard to the most basic or “grassroots” level of CPK authority: the villages, the subdistricts and rural agricultural producer cooperatives. The third focuses on what the CPK considered some ways the key intermediary level of power between the Centre and the grassroots: the district, which in at least some contexts was deemed more important than the other intermediate layers of CPK administration – the large zones and the sectors that were mostly between the districts and the zones. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from documents originally in Khmer, including ECCC testimony, are by the author. Finally, I wish to thank the UK Economic and Social Research Council and the Open Society Foundation for their generous funding for this work, and also to thank Andrew Johnston for his great help in editing the text.

Section One: Centre Policies for the Nation as a Whole

1960-1970

Officially, the Communist Party that in power called itself the CPK claimed while in power that its policies and practices in power should be traced back to a Party gathering in September 1960. It described this conclave as a national Party Congress and enumerated it as the first such meeting of the Party organization that was eventually renamed the CPK. In a retrospective account in September 1977, then CPK Central Committee Secretary Pol Pot presented his version of the results of the Congress. Pol spoke of an analysis of the class structure and class conflicts in Cambodian society as of 1960, and how he said the Party decided to relate to them in order to make what it called a “national people’s democratic revolution” in the then Kingdom of Cambodia’s Sangkum Resatr Niyum regime of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. As Pol’s speech explained it, the Party’s 1960 line of national people's democratic revolution aimed to liberate Cambodia from a purported imperialist domination that made the country “semi-colonial” and simultaneously to liberate the vast majority of its people from what the Party characterized as a “semi-feudal” social system and thereby make Cambodia “democratic.” This project was based on an analysis of Cambodian society according to which it comprised five distinct classes: the peasantry, the working class, the petty bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie and the
feudal class. There were said to be various complex and much entangled contradictions among these five social formations. However, the dominant and most antagonistic was purportedly that of the peasantry with the feudal gentry (landlords). Although the peasantry was also in contradiction with the bourgeoisie, this analysis made the main domestic task of the national people’s democratic revolution to mobilize the peasantry against the feudal gentry, this being its “democratic” aspect. Nevertheless, according to the Party’s united front line for such a revolution, the Communists were also to try to unite all patriotic strata and individuals, regardless of individual class background, to join with the peasants in a struggle that was also aimed at expelling imperialism from Cambodia. The Party’s allies in this struggle therefore could and should include, to the extent politically possible, members of the feudal nobility and other high-ranking personalities within the ruling classes, including certain comprador and other big bourgeoisie, landlords, civil servants and Buddhist monks: all those with a patriotic, progressive and national outlook whom the Party could gather in to function as supplementary forces in a national people’s democratic front.1

Elaborating on what he said was the Party’s 1960 understanding of contradictions, Pol’s 1977 talk described various kinds. He defined the contradiction that “played the leading role in society” as the one most involving the majority of the population because it pitted the most numerous and most exploited class against the class that most exploited others. He said the 1960 Congress stipulated this was the contradiction between the peasantry, enumerated as comprising 85% of the population, and the gentry among the feudal class. He also described this as the predominant and the principle contradiction in Cambodian society.2 He furthermore characterized it as a life-and-death and antagonistic contradiction, which therefore required a struggle and fight for it to be resolved.3 According to Pol’s speech, the Congress defined the domestic enemies of the national people’s democratic revolution in class and political terms as “the reactionary feudal gentry and comprador class.”4 Its purpose was to attack the system of the reactionary feudal gentry and compradors, in order that it be “toppled and dissolved.”5 Pol stipulated that this attack on feudalism had not been an attack on individual members of the feudal gentry, but on its system of exploitation.6 Pol said the peasantry -- plus the working class -- were deemed the “fundamental strategic forces” for the national people’s democratic revolution,7 with the poor and lower-middle strata of the peasantry being especially strategic forces8 and purportedly totalling 75% of the population.9 Altogether, the peasantry as a whole, the working class and “other labouring people” -- another revolutionary force -- supposedly added up to 90% of the population.10 As Pol elucidated it, the Party position was that as long as the peasantry supported the revolution, the majority of the rest of the population would be socially obliged to join with other revolutionary forces in doing so, too.11 Further clarifying this analysis, he said the petty bourgeoisie was deemed to be an ally in making national people’s democratic revolution and the national bourgeoisie a “force of strategic assistance” for it. There were also “tactical forces” among the feudal class and the comprador stratum of the bourgeoisie who were of use to the revolution because they were politically patriotic or progressive. Altogether, these strategic and tactical forces were enumerated as comprising more than 95% of the Cambodian people, and Party policy was to gather and lead them in a general attack on the remaining less than 5% of the population constituting the enemies deemed reactionaries among the feudal gentry and comprador stratum of the bourgeoisie.12 With regard to the revolution’s treatment of its enemies, Pol recalled,
Our line was to distinguish three categories of enemies. First, win over any enemy who could be won over on some occasions; second, whenever possible, neutralize some of them in order to make them incapable of conducting any activities to attack us; third, isolate the contemptibly vicious ones in order to attack them. There were some opportunities for us to be able to differentiate among enemies and make use of the contradictions among them.\(^{13}\)

The Party’s position was evidently elaborated in an early 1960s Platform, which identified various strata and substrata among the feudal class, such as titled aristocracy, “feudal officialdom” and several types of landlords among the gentry, and also divided the bourgeoisie into compradors and a national bourgeoisie. It identified some 200 titled members of the feudal class as the national people’s democratic revolution’s “most important enemies,” saying that with few exceptions, they served imperialism, exploited the people and thoroughly opposed democratization of Cambodian society. The feudal gentry and comprador bourgeoisie were defined as “strategic enemies” of the revolution, while the poor and lower-middle peasantry was characterized as the “support base for the revolution.” As for the national bourgeoisie, its members were politically split into left- and right-wing elements. As a stratum, the national bourgeoisie was one of the “forces of the revolution.” So was the petty bourgeoisie, despite a politically indecisive nature. However, those national bourgeois elements characterized as “reactionary” were included alongside the feudal gentry and comprador bourgeoisie as “strategic enemies.” Such notions of political distinctions across class boundaries were also applied to the “ruling class” as a whole, saying that it was divided into “rightists,” “intermediary factions,” and “progressive factions.” Individual members of the latter two categories could evidently be part of the revolution’s national democratic people’s front against imperialism and Cambodia’s semi-feudal society, if they were deemed “patriotic personalities” or could otherwise be won over. Concretely, however, the progressives among the ruling class were “very few” in number and most of those in the intermediate factions were politically reactionary.\(^{14}\)

Commenting on this period in testimony to the Trial Chamber of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, ex-Party Deputy Secretary Nuon Chea has echoed Pol’s speech in stating that the first stage of the revolutionary project launched from 1960 was a national people’s democratic revolution that combined national people’s and a democratic aspects, the former in order to liberate Cambodia from “semi-colonialism” to make it independent, the latter in order to liberate its people from “semi-feudalism” to make it democratic.\(^{15}\) A 1972 Party document looking back on what it characterized as the Party’s 1960s “political struggle” for national people’s democratic revolution summed up the efforts aimed at achieving this goal as focused on “the reactionary feudal and bourgeois” elements among these two then “power-holding classes,”\(^{16}\) a formulation that appears to reflect a line of making distinctions among them. Nuon has retrospectively insisted on this, explaining that Party’s position was not one of simple “classism,”\(^{17}\) and that avoiding classism meant that “no matter what class someone was, as long as they possessed a patriotic spirit,” it was Party policy to gather them in politically.\(^{18}\) Thus, individuals in all strata of all classes could and should be mobilized to join the national people’s democratic revolution, “except for those elements who were lackeys of aggressive imperialism.”\(^{19}\) Nuon states these latter included those deemed reactionary feudal elements and therefore an “internal enemy” of the revolution, comprising “those feudalists
who were lackeys of imperialism, ultra-vicious in ill-treating the people and traitors to the nation,” adding that although “feudal means landlord,” for the Party’s political purposes, it distinguished “vicious landlords” from other types. He also characterizes the main target of the revolution in this period not as capitalism, but “the crud of colonialism types, their oppression and repression.” In a public statement in 1972, Member of the Standing Committee of the CPK Central Committee Ieng Sary also stressed the Party’s non-classist approach, declaring that its front policies provided for incorporation of individuals from “all the social classes and strata,” unless they were deemed to be “traitors … in the service of imperialism.”

1970-1975

Party policy during the early 1970s, when it was engaged in an armed conflict with the Khmer Republic and still in pursuit of a national people’s democratic revolution, appears to have been built on that of the 1960s. As it later explained, “the quintessential reality of a national people’s democratic revolution” in this period was “a class struggle” of “a people confronted with imperialism, feudalism and reactionary bourgeois.” Cadre were indoctrinated at this time that the Party ultimately represented the interests of the worker-peasant classes and revolutionary intellectuals against those of the imperialists, feudalists, bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie and other counter-revolutionary or non-revolutionary elements. By late 1972, the CPK declared, the “the class struggle against the reactionary feudals and bourgeois” had already become “more and more profound” than in the 1960s and would become “more and more profound and sharp” in the future. This was in part because “the reactionary feudals and the reactionary bourgeoisie” were “having all kinds of tenacious reactions of opposition, overt or covert,” both in response to the Party’s establishment of its own state power in the countryside and its implementation of a land reform programme. According to a subsequent Party document, this programme had by this time “eliminated to a degree the old feudal landlord relations of production” by distributing land seized by the CPK’s state power from “traitors” and persons who had fled what the CPK called its “liberated zones,” giving this land to landless people. According to another subsequent official account, in 1972-73, the CPK was sharpening its class struggle by putting “forward political and ideological measures arranging for the people to attack feudal and bourgeois power, cutting off private trade, grasping commerce, attacking the old relations of production and making arrangements for new relations of production,” above all by moving toward setting up agricultural production cooperatives to organize the strength of what the Party called “the base people” as the foundation of “a solid worker-peasant alliance” for national people’s democratic revolution. In class terms, the base people comprised the poor and lower-middle peasantry. Party policy was to combine these economic and organization measures with “class struggle on the ideological battlefield” against reactionary bourgeois and landlords, with reactionary defined as a stance of exploiting the people.

According to an official history, on 20 May 1973, the Party decided to go ahead with the establishment of full-fledged peasant cooperatives as part of the revolution’s advance into a phase of “absolute democratic revolution” that attacked and had by 1974 “basically both overthrown the exploiting classes and attacked and eliminated the production relations of the exploiting classes, furthermore creating conditions for a future advance toward the construction of socialism and communism in Cambodia. In the Party’s view, this was because “setting up cooperatives cut off the landlords and bourgeoisie economically. The landlords and bourgeoisie were no longer owners of paddy and rice, no longer the masters of the economy,” which was
instead in the hands of the cooperatives themselves and the local state authority in the liberated zones. Also, by the Party’s account, this made it possible to “maximally isolate” and otherwise “pressurize” feudalists and the bourgeoisie while gathering in “big and broad national people’s forces” to the revolution’s side. It reported the result was that, “having assembled the strength of the base people into a force of the worker-peasant alliance, we were further able to gather in upper strata forces. … Once the worker-peasant alliance was strong, the other forces perforce became satellites of the worker-peasant alliance’s strength, all the way up to the bourgeoisie and landlords, who had to become subordinated to cooperatives and the revolutionary state power.”

Similarly, it said that by “arranging for the setting up of cooperatives assembled the strength of the poor and lower-middle peasants so that they possessed the authority and the means to implement the Party’s production line,” conditions were established in which “other, upper-strata forces had to go along with the poor and lower-middle peasantry.”

While stressing such compulsory incorporation, Party documents also gave guidance that “no matter what the issue, it is necessary in order to resolve it to rely basically on politics and ideology, necessary to use re-education to achieve a clear understanding, and only thereafter to apply organizational measures,” warning that if cadre thought “only in terms of organizational work and not of politics and ideology, no results will be achieved.” They were also warned that if they thought “only in terms of organizational measures, compelling” people “to do things they don’t understand, the enemy will only have to nudge them a bit, and there will be problems.”

More generally, cadre were told they should never intimidate or threaten the people, and that the people should never be blamed for not understanding or not supporting the Party line. For example, it was not the people’s fault if they were unhappy about food shortages.

In any case, Party histories recounted that the establishment of agricultural production cooperatives provoked a reaction among their class opponents who allegedly organized bandits, spies and pacification agents to resist the new socio-economic and socio-political regime cooperatives constituted, and that such elements were not to be incorporated, but eliminated. Specifically, in 1973-74, the feudal landlord class and the bourgeoisie, “who had suffered a loss of interests due to the cooperatives,” allegedly “joined with American imperialism and the contemptible traitors to powerfully whip up pacification, espionage and bandit activities” by elements who tried to “implant themselves” in the villages and “go into the jungle to conduct attack activities,” but these were “smashed … one after the other.” This was one of the ways of “making national people’s democratic revolution to drive out the American imperialist aggressors and their lackeys and to attack and smash the traitors to liberate the nation and class.”

Against this background, the Party in late 1974 authoritatively restated its position on the classes and contradictions of Cambodian society in considerable detail, including with regard to “the imperialist-feudal-bourgeois exploiting classes” it said it had already basically overthrown in the rural areas under its control but which still dominated in Khmer Republic areas. While treating class as fundamentally an objective economic phenomenon defining socio-economic groups, this Party policy document also stressed subjective political factors inhering in individuals. Thus, the text explained with regard to the “criteria for class analysis,” that:

In order to stipulate what class this person is and what class that person is, we make an analysis of:
1. Economic criteria, which are the most basic and important analytical criteria
2. Political criteria

1. Economic Criteria

There are many economic criteria: material, means of production, standard of living, etc., but the key link is whether labour is engaged in or not ....

2. Political Criteria

Having thus observed their economic criteria, we also observe their political criteria, and having gone over their political criteria, we observe their political attitude. Then, we proceed from their economic and political criteria, that is to say, we proceed from their economic and political interests in order to stipulate what class they are in. However, among these two sets of criteria, the economic criteria are the important premise, and among these economic criteria, we must proceed from ownership of the means and tools of production and from their relations of production. This is the general principle. However, beyond this, it is imperative to look at how they have been influenced by various classes. ...

Political criteria were assimilated into the evaluation “which class a human being is in” so that the Party would not be “confused by external appearances.” Such “clear-cut class analyses” were necessary in order that the Party “be able to gather forces effectively,” knowing “which forces we must gather in, neutralize, isolate or attack,” to “make a clear-cut distinction between friends and enemies” and correctly “gather in friendly forces and attack the enemy on target.”

That said, the document’s own analysis divided the feudal class into the feudal nobility and the feudal gentry, specifying that “the feudal nobility refers to those feudalists holding power who possess that power in order to exploit the people, from royalty, mandarins, government ministers, provincial governors, district governors down to subdistrict chiefs and deputy chiefs.” It affirmed that, in the liberated zones, the feudal nobility no longer existed, with only certain individuals still in place. It cautioned that they were still inclined to “serve the enemy,” but stated that Party policy was to “win them over into the Front and attack and erode their political and ideological stance by propagandizing them,” but especially to assign them “land on which to do productive labour.” This was in accord with the instruction Party cadre were given that “ancien régime” provincial governors, district governors, etc” were feudalists by virtue of their governmental functions, the implication being that loss of those functions neutralized at least part of what made them feudal.

 Turing to the feudal gentry, the document defined them as “those having property and power in land” and using “land as a means of exploitation” of the peasantry. The document said that in the liberated zones there was “no more exploitation via land” and landlords therefore only existed as economically declassed individuals, although they still had “an ideological stance of
exploitation” and were also inclined to serve the enemy, “intentionally or unintentionally.” Nevertheless, policy was not to “think exclusively in terms of attacking them,” but instead to “win them over into the ranks of our Front” while reducing them to the same position as peasants in terms of access to paddy land to farm and having a “spirit of vigilance in their regard at all times.”

The document reiterated the long-standing division of the bourgeoisie into a comprador bourgeoisie, defined as big capitalists selling domestic produce abroad, and a national bourgeoisie, defined as “capitalists who make their living inside the country, whether in industry, trade or agriculture.” Repeating the arguments it had made with regard to the feudal class, it affirmed that the comprador bourgeoisie no longer existed except as individuals in the liberated zones, and the national bourgeoisie was almost as completely disestablished. It warned that individual members of the comprador bourgeoisie were still politically “with imperialism” and were only kept prevented from acting on its behalf by the force of revolutionary organization, and that therefore necessary to maintain a “high level of revolutionary vigilance in their regard.” By contrast, national bourgeois elements were still, as in the 1960s, considered at least potentially a “force of strategic assistance to the national people’s democratic revolution,” but nevertheless “rather two-faced” politically. Thus, although efforts must be made to “win them over” to the revolution, it was also necessary to be “vigilant” about them.

The petty bourgeoisie was defined economically as class that neither exploited others nor was itself exploited by others and was divided into intellectual and trading strata, the former including students and those civil servants who made their living primarily via their intellect. The document said the petty bourgeoisie generally had “a national and democratic nature,” but was politically vacillating, especially its trading stratum. Similarly, this class was generally an ally of the “worker-peasants” that could be politically gathered in as a major force for revolution, but could not be considered as a mainstay of the revolution.

Both the peasantry and the working class, although overall the mainstay of the revolution, were also both divided into several strata. Among the peasantry, only the lower-middle and poor peasantry, defined as lacking the possibility of having enough to eat, with shortages of one or more months annually, was characterized as being unproblematic in economic class terms. Even then, its members could be politically problematic as a result of having been so “long under feudal hegemony” as to be “slow of political understanding.” They must therefore be analyzed with “an all-round perspective,” seeing beyond their poverty and recognizing their need to be re-educated and refashioned over some period of time into revolutionaries. Workers, too, included “liberal” and “hooligan” elements, and therefore could not be automatically assumed to be revolutionary. In sum, class origin per se was not a fool-proof indicator of ability to make revolution.

Wartime Party training additionally identified four “separate class types” or “special separate class types” that did not fit neatly into its broader and primarily economically-based class schema of the feudal class, bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, peasantry and working class. Although there was some overlap with this underlying schema, it also seemed that what made these types separate and special was the particular extent to which political criteria were significant in their regard. The four types were Buddhist monks, intellectuals, police/soldiers and “all nationalities.”
Monks were a special class who did not labour and relied economically on the whole people, but in particular the peasantry. They were politically influenced by whatever class was contributing most to their livelihood, and thus many of them were politically peasants. Thus, although most monks - those who were economically dependent on the peasantry - were in class terms “like the peasantry,” those connected to the upper social strata were politically influenced by them. These included most of the organized Buddhist sangha (monastic community) officialdom. Monks connected to the peasantry could generally be relied upon to be patriotic, but they were likely to lack any clear class consciousness because of their incorporation into a group with no clear class boundaries.

As the general Party schema indicated, intellectuals were, generally speaking, petty bourgeois, but were divided into reactionary and progressive strata, according to their economic situation and their political relations with other classes. As a whole, intellectuals could be considered petty bourgeois with revolutionary potential, but some should be located with the feudalists and bourgeoisie and were reactionaries.

Logically linked to the “feudal nobility,” police and soldiers, especially those who actually carried arms, were generally political reactionaries as a result of the influence of the ruling classes on their “true nature,” even if they might sometimes turn on Cambodia's foreign oppressors. Thus, to the extent that they served the enemy state power, they were “absolutely reactionary,” although under certain circumstances, they might become anti-imperialist. Still, Party cadre were taught that they should pursue a policy of lenient treatment of former enemy soldiers and civil servants.

Finally, “each and every nationality in Cambodian society” was divided into classes. The minority nationalities living in the forested hills were mostly peasants suffering from severe economic deprivation, and were thus “most highly politically combative” and a very important revolutionary force. Cham were fully divided into economic classes, “just like Khmer,” and most were peasants.57 So, cadre were taught that the Party's worker-peasant alliance included all national minority elements, but they were also told that in order to avoid “complications,” nationality worker-peasant people need not be included among revolutionary forces.58

Commenting on such matters in ECCC testimony, Nuon has repeatedly recollected that the Party’s opposition to feudalism meant destruction of the feudal “system,” not all feudal individuals, and therefore allowed for individual distinctions to be made among such individuals, right up to and including the highest royalty.59 Thus, he states, pursuant to the national people’s democratic revolution, “it was the feudal system against which we had to struggle and make disappear,” but Party policy was also that individuals deemed to be of feudal class were politically divided, such that only those designated as “reactionary, vicious lackeys of imperialism” or as “traitorous servants of imperialism, who join with imperialism to act as servants of imperialism” were treated as enemies.60 According to his testimony, the Party did not “lump everything together in one go,” but made distinctions, because it believed there was “no way that all of them are traitors all the time.” Instead, there were “reactionary feudalists, but some feudalists have a national spirit,” so there were aristocrats and nobles who were politically good and others who were traitors, and not all officials of the old regime were labeled as enemies.61 Thus, Nuon maintains, during the war, not all contradictions between the peasantry and
individual landlords were antagonistic, life-and-death ones, only those in the cases of particularly “cruel landlords” or in which “a landlord was acting as lackey of imperialism, a lackey of the aggressors, serving the aggressors.” He states that contradictions between the peasantry and “ordinary landlords” were internal ones that could be resolved by non-violent means.\textsuperscript{62} Similarly, with regard to “subdistrict chiefs and their deputies, police, soldiers and petty civil servants or royal officials,” he says a distinction was made between the “some” among them “who oppressed the peasantry,” and those who did not.\textsuperscript{63} In particular, this meant that only “some subdistrict chiefs and their deputies, police, soldiers and petty civil servants or royal officials … oppressed the peasantry,”\textsuperscript{64} and that therefore not all contradictions with subdistrict chiefs, their deputies or other local officials were acute, life-and-death contradictions, again because “some” of them were “good.” In sum, “They were not all deemed the same.”\textsuperscript{65}

A corollary to this was, according to Nuon, was that while the most important criteria for recruitment into the party was a good “class essence,” that is, being a poor peasant, the “various other classes” could also join, but had to undergo a long probationary period.\textsuperscript{66} Indeed, contemporary documents indicate that despite the stigmatization of classes and strata other than worker-peasants and revolutionary intellectuals as having counter-revolutionary interests as classes and strata, Party membership was open not only to “progressive Cambodian nationals” with good lower-class backgrounds and intellectual competence, but also to individuals of higher social origins. The difference was that while all had to be politically and morally clean, as demonstrated by a clear biography, for potential members of higher class origins, those introducing their biographies to the Party had to be cadre of long standing, and they had to spend an extended time as candidate members before achieving full membership.\textsuperscript{67}

Theorizing the overall argument, Nuon has affirmed that “it was not individual human beings whom we treated as the enemy,” but rather “their conduct that was the enemy.”\textsuperscript{68} However, while also stating that making such determinations was “very complicated” and required going into detail about particular cases,\textsuperscript{69} he has seemed to be unable clearly to specify how exactly this was supposed to be done. For example, as regards the key concept of being politically reactionary, presented as the grounds on which individual distinctions were to be made between enemies and at least potential friends, Nuon apparently could not go beyond defining reactionaries as “those who oppose.” He stated he could not provide an “exhaustive answer” regarding the word’s precise meaning, indicating there could be many types,\textsuperscript{70} while simply declaring at one point, “Whoever was an adversary was an adversary.”\textsuperscript{71} In this period, Ieng Sary is said by witness Klan Fit to have defined “the enemy” simply as “those who oppress the people.”\textsuperscript{72} These statements echo the above-mentioned equally vague wartime Party definition of reactionary as a stance of exploiting the people.\textsuperscript{73}

This nebulousness or subjectivity was also an issue with regard to the flip side of the Party’s non-classist position, as expressed in Party warnings that even base people in class terms required re-education and refashioning. In this regard, Nuon has remarked that just because a person’s class background was good, this provided no guarantee against them being ideologically or politically bad.\textsuperscript{74} Thus, he states, the notion of good classness “was merely theoretical, but in practice, it included some scoundrels. The good ones were the majority, but other than them, there were also no-good persons. It was not a matter of totality.”\textsuperscript{75} In particular, Nuon says, “normally, all peasants” were deemed “good” in that peasantry as a whole
was considered “entirely good.” However “some” individual peasants behaved in a manner that made them no-good elements.  

Moreover, Nuon has recalled that, during the war, the Party concluded that some of the people who joined the revolution were no-good elements and suspected some of them were enemy infiltrators. He states that with regard to such persons, “the CPK re-educated and refashioned them time and time again to make them into patriots, but not all of them could be re-educated or refashioned. The majority of those who could not be re-educated or refashioned were espionage agents planted in the cooperatives and one-time hooligan drunks and brawlers, while those who joined the army similarly did so in order to wreck cooperatives and the army from within.”  

Contemporaneous documentation also indicates the Party admonished cadre that its enemies were trying to infiltrate its ranks, including its security forces, and to make contact with no-good elements among the population to oppose the revolution. Such infiltrators were deemed responsible for ultra-left and ultra-right deviations in the implementation of the Party line, and they had to be “sorted out according to Party principles.” Also for this reason, the Party’s “working machinery” from bottom-to-top was supposed to “be constantly purged.”  

This necessity was argued in the context of assertions about general threats to the revolution that the CPK said was posed because of a “class struggle with the enemy” that it characterized as “a life-and-death struggle” and a normal state of affairs. “Overthrowing the landlord system” and establishing cooperatives was not sufficient to put an end to this, and therefore other measures were necessary in order not to allow “the enemy [to] mess us up from the inside,” such as by its various “pacification” measures, including the activities of kinh (government informers or agents). In dealing with such dangers, cadre must know “how to grasp and resolve contradictions big and small.” As the Party had previously explained with regard to problems with those it deemed as being among national people’s democratic front forces, “One must consider whether there are enemy activities involved, or it is happening because of our friends don’t yet understand something, or does it come from shortcomings in our Party’s leadership?”  

Once, however, someone’s activities were judged to be those of an enemy, it was the duty of the Party to “make sure enemies are smashed one after the other.” This was imperative to “give an impetus to the frontline morale” of troops fighting the Khmer Republic, and unless the Party was pro-active in smashing all enemies, they would “sooner or later … organize systematically” against the revolution.  

On the eve of the CPK’s 17 April 1975 victory, Party cadre were again warned that enemy pacification agents were trying to burrow from within the liberated zones. It was said that such enemies must be urgently eliminated because as the Party’s adversary Khmer Republic regime neared defeat, and indeed even more so once it was defeated, die-hard attempts would be made to reverse revolutionary victories. The Party explained that many of these pacification agents were disguised as monks, refugees or traders, and although they might appear to be inactive, they were making contact in the already liberated zones with kinh, former government police, soldiers and civil servants, relatives of Khmer Republic officials, hooligans and other persons there having grudges against the revolution in order to carry out counter-revolutionary plots. “Absolute measures to attack and smash every last one” of enemies of the revolution in the liberated zones were therefore imperative.
April–December 1975

The nation-wide CPK victory signaled by the seizure of Phnom Penh by Party-led military forces on 17 April 1975 created the opportunity for the formulation and implementation a new set of Party policies, building on the old, as it entered what it called “a new period of the democratic revolution” with the overthrow of “neo-colonialist imperialism,” which completed the national aspect of the national people’s democratic revolution. A key means of effecting this advance was the Party’s decision to evacuate people from Phnom Penh and provincial seats previously under Khmer Republic administration, while also closing “every last market” in the country. This made it possible to complete the process already begun in the liberated zones of eliminating the feudal class and bourgeoisie by now totally overthrowing and disbanding all “private systems” throughout Cambodia, thereby completely destroying the economic foundations of the “urban bourgeoisie,” other ruling and upper classes and strata, and even the private aspects of urban working class livelihood. It was said to have been possible because the previous creation of “peasant cooperatives” had created a “foundation for socialist revolution in the liberated zones” into which the evacuees were sent to live with people who were veteran residents of the liberated zones. It separated the former town dwellers from and thereby eliminated the last bastions of concentrated private property in the country, which left them “powerless to oppose” the revolution and ensured “inevitable collapse” of private property itself.

As the Party put it, the “evacuation of the people from the towns was us doing class struggle,” which alongside its on-going consolidation of the cooperatives established in the countryside was “a class struggle to attack and disperse bourgeois and feudal forces.” In conjunction with the closure of markets, it created a situation in which the feudalist class and the bourgeoisie were “destroyed, reduced to naught and disintegrated as classes along with the political regime and economic foundations.” These two “exploiting classes” therefore no longer existed in Cambodian society. As for the petty bourgeoisie, including the one-time civil servants, the intellectuals and petty traders in its ranks who had been living in Khmer Republic areas, its members were transformed, like individual former landlords and members of the bourgeoisie both among the veteran people and newly-arrived from the towns, into “productive labourers,” into “new peasants of petty bourgeoisie, feudal or bourgeois origin.” In the Party narrative, the evacuation thus put an end to the urban-based feudalist class, bourgeoisie and petty bourgeois intellectual strata as classes and strata by sending them to live under the political control of the toiling peasantry among the veteran people residents of the countryside and making them a part of Cambodia’s “worker-peasant” class, which was henceforth to comprise 99% of the country’s population. All this made Cambodia fully “democratic” and prepared it to make “the switchover to socialist revolution,” given that, the Party proclaimed, “all of Cambodia’s people” were now living “in equality due to the fact that all of them engage in the work of productive labour.”

In September, the Party further confirmed this by officially stipulating the abolition of the petty bourgeoisie and the strata it had previously described as “separate class types” or “special separate class types,” i.e., Buddhist monks, intellectuals, soldiers/police and “all nationalities,” leaving only the “working class-peasantry” having a socio-economic existence, because, it later explained, “Anyone who works in a worker milieu we deem a worker. Anyone who works in a
peasant milieu we deem a peasant. One aspect of this was that like other class strata who were not categorized as peasants or workers, evacuated Buddhist monks and monks who had previously been living among veteran people should “no longer exist” in the sense that they must abandon their religion and their pagodas and be re-fashioned as peasants. Getting them out of their robes and pagodas into the fields with peasants who were too busy at agricultural labour to practice Buddhist merit-making ceremonies, including giving alms to monks, would put an effective end to Buddhism. This more or less coincided with the last mention in public media of Buddhist monks, Cham and other “national minorities.” The Cham were said to have been “liberated from all kinds of oppression” and to be headed “towards progress and prosperity in all aspects” of a new, fully “democratic” life while having achieved a “political awakening” and being “educated and guided” by the Party’s organization to adopt “a new revolutionary concept … of the nation.” As regards Cambodia’s Chinese community, the official CPK line was that even the comprador bourgeoisie among this nationality, the richest Chinese with the strongest connection to imperialism, could now be transformed into new people worker-peasants, like other evacuees. All this was taken as accelerating the switchover to making socialist revolution, and by November 1975, the Party proclaimed that “the first steps of socialist revolution and the construction of socialism” had begun and therefore the “new phase of socialist revolution” was well and truly entered, along with which came constitution of its power as a “dictatorship of the proletariat.” Thereafter, the whole population was supposed to adopt a “proletarian stance.” This required the elimination not only of the stances of the economically disestablished feudal class, bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, but also the “peasant stance” of that class, which must be politically displaced with that of the proletariat as part of the Party’s now socialist revolution.

In this context, general CPK policy was to get the individual remnants of the overthrown upper, middle and special class strata to contribute directly to economic production in a countryside populated by new and veteran peasants living “in equality with one another, without division into classes” and enjoying “equality in growth and development in terms of material living standards.” It was therefore necessary to go all out to improve the living standards of these “new people” in order to win them to the side of the revolution. The Party aimed thereby to make the evacuees a stable part of a “monolithic bloc of solidarity with the revolutionary state power.” To this end, cadre were instructed to adopt a “broad-minded perspective” vis-à-vis evacuees, be “flexible” and “indulgent” with them. They should guard against being too easily exasperated with the newcomers, do nothing that would adversely affect their interests, and certainly not treat them as “prisoners of war.” Cadre should also prevent “intolerance between veteran and new people,” promote “good solidarity among the people as a whole (veteran and new people),” and organize new people to work alongside veteran people in an “atmosphere of happiness and solidarity.”

Cadre must ensure they were supplied with food while “deploying their strength to work.” They should sort out the new people’s living standards “to make them see that this regime is one that belongs to them.” Veteran people should welcome new people and share land, livestock and food with them and empty existing granaries in order to feed evacuees. They were not to exploit the new people's labour, but to work with them to establish the basis for the modernization of agriculture. They should “battle day and night to increase production” to help sustain those who had “just come down to the countryside with nothing but their bare
The poor and lower-middle peasantry in particular should demonstrate its “total lack of prejudice” vis-a-vis the newcomers. Such base class people should “help by providing everything they have to eat to the new people” without resentment or being concerned about their own hunger. Thus, new and veteran people should be “living, working, studying, having good times, enjoying prosperity or enduring hunger collectively, in the collectivity of the cooperatives.” To make their re-education effective, cadre would have to prove to them that the Party was truly practicing the economic equality it preached, and was “immaculately clean” (i.e., not corrupt).

According, therefore, to the optimistic official Party view at this time, 95% of the new people were “good” people who could be re-educated “to see the revolutionary path.” These “new peasants” were in general politically trustworthy, especially those of humble class origins, but even the upper strata deportees were politically redeemable. “Virtually all of them” could be politically “refashioned” now that they were labourers. This applied to former Khmer Republic “civil servants, the petty bourgeoisie, merchants, national and comprador bourgeoisie, former nobility, etc.” who had all become “class elements” of the new peasantry. It was therefore imperative for the revolution “not to see them like before, as bourgeoise, as university faculty, as civil servants, as petty bourgeois students, as traders, as national or comprador bourgeoisie.” Because they had lost everything materially, their “quintessential class reality” was already changing considerably for the better, the majority of them could be “quickly transformed” politically, no matter how bourgeois they might be, through repeated “lifestyle meetings and studies.” The essence of the Party’s policy was “to re-educate them again and again.” Their social transformation would take place through an overall reduction in class contradictions and of “original class substance” in the rural Party-organized agricultural production cooperatives where everyone would have “an equal standard of living.”

However, in addition to its considerations based on notions of class as defined by economic criteria as organized social formations, the Party had previously indicated a need for such measures rooted in political criteria by warning that all classes living in the towns, including the workers and peasants residing there, were “right next” to the enemy's leadership apparatus. A more specific political rationale for the evacuation, according to what Party cadre were soon told, was that although the Khmer Republic was defeated, its erstwhile US imperialist backer was, through the CIA, hoping to topple the new revolutionary regime via a coup d'état. It was said this had been planned by US imperialism in case of a Khmer Republic military defeat, and the objective was to destroy the revolution using pacification agents, spies and prostitutes. The motivation for removing the people from Phnom Penh and provincial towns was therefore to break up the CIA's organized networks and disperse them and other “enemy links” into existing Party-organized rural agricultural production cooperatives to pre-empt this counter-revolutionary blow and then transform the emptied towns into worker-peasant-labourer enclaves. In addition to scattering these supposedly traitorous links to the countryside to pre-empt such a counter-revolutionary revolt, evacuating the population would eliminate the threat that by their very presence they would ideologically contaminate the CPK cadre and combatants who entered the towns.

Moreover, scattering them into the cooperatives and re-educating them was not enough to eliminate the threat they supposedly posed. As Pol explained in July 1975, although “the feudal class and bourgeoisie as classes have been overthrown” because they had been toppled as
organized regimes, they still wanted to wreck and smash the revolution in order to retake power. It was therefore necessary to continue smashing “remnants of the defeated enemy” and other “internal enemies,” specifically spies and saboteurs who were attempting covertly to wreck or otherwise oppose the revolution. He said these were linked to “colonialisms and imperialisms new and old” and were acting on behalf of the “tricks and schemes” of the overthrown feudal and bourgeois classes. Cadre were trained that feudal remnants, kinh, pacification agents, spies and undercover enemies among the evacuees enjoyed potential backing not only from US imperialism, but from Communist Viet Nam. This was linked to general Party instructions to “absolutely not let the enemy insert their people to carry out espionage or sabotage or wreck” the revolution. Party orders were to identify supposedly enemy-implanted networks of pacification agents, informers, saboteurs and commandos, then smash them as individuals in order to eradicate their organized activities. The Party furthermore expressed its concern that “enemy agents and various other bad elements” who had been relocated to the countryside among evacuees were “still chaotically mixed in among the ranks of the new people.” In an explication stressing the characterization of the enemy as the purported lackeys of US imperialism, it specified that those most likely to be recruited into their opposition networks were individual remnants of the feudal class and bourgeoisie sent down the countryside, who, upon being contacted by US imperialism or its lackeys, “easily return to quickly and actively serving the enemy.”

Thus, even if in principle 95% of the new people were good, the remaining 5% were problematic or worse and part of the 2% of the country’s whole population (estimated as 70% per cent veteran and 30% new people) who were politically beyond the Party’s political “grasp.” They included fugitive Khmer Republic officers and officials, covert kinh, “every type of horrible element” and various other “no-good elements” who would never be happy with the revolution even if they were well-fed. Everyone must be vigilant against these all such persons. None of the admonitions about treating evacuees as people applied to such “traitors” among them. On the contrary, one of the Party’s constant immediate tasks was to “heighten the spirit of revolutionary vigilance” against these “traitorous links” among the new people, especially among the ranks of former soldiers and police, who were actively trying to link back up with one another to conduct “propaganda, opposition and sabotage” against the revolution. They must be “attacked,” which presumably meant smashed. At the popular level, veteran peasants themselves therefore must not only take “charge of administering the education and re-fashioning of the ... people who have just been liberated from the rule of the contemptible traitors,” but also help suppress the “enemy agents and a variety of other no-good elements” who were “chaotically mixed in among” the evacuees. To achieve this end, the Party must continue, as it had done in the countryside before 17 April 1975, to mobilize the people to join “most enthusiastically in making a revolution to smash the enemy.”

The Party’s view was also that although the old feudal-bourgeois system of class oppression had been overthrown, the bad ideological influence of these deposed classes remained a threat to the revolution. “The evil influence” of the society they had created was still felt among the people and even in the revolutionary ranks. Thus, the post-17 April period was characterized by “ever more severe and complex class struggle” manifest in contention “between an ideological stance of individual and personal property and the proletarian stance of absolute self-abnegation.” Winning this ideological battle required “a constant heightening of
revolutionary vigilance” in order to “guarantee the switchover to socialist revolution and communism now and in the future,” especially in the cooperatives in which the new people had been inserted, which would be cockpits of the sharpest and most seething class conflict. In this context, new people were generally not to be allowed to have the political membership rights in the cooperatives accorded to veteran peasants. They would have first to be “tempered in the movement in order to build up a revolutionary stance.” This was because until they were politically refashioned, the new people could not be guaranteed to side with the revolution against the enemies hidden among them. As “types who had lived an easy life” before, they were less politically dependable than the “poor basic people” and more liable to become involved in the traitorous activities of covert Cambodian kinh who were stubbornly trying overthrow the revolution at the behest of the CIA and other foreign intelligence agencies. Indeed, because their transformation was just beginning, all “the strata of the new worker-peasant people who have just been liberated from the towns” were still “leading carriers of imperialist-feudalist-bourgeois outlooks, stances, ideologies, world views and credos.” They had not given up “their greedy desires from the old days when they exploited the workers and the peasants.” They would try to disseminate their “remnant crud” and “evil influences” among the veteran people and the revolutionary ranks. As long as they continued to hold on to their individualistic tendencies and were reluctant to live in cooperatives in which “poor and lower-middle peasants” ranked as “the most exalted members,” coercion must be applied to them. They must be “compelled to accept the leadership of the worker-peasant” regime in the countryside, “to go down to increase production in ... the co-operatives, just like other peasants” and thus be “transformed into peasants, whether they like it or not.” To facilitate this, they must be “split up” so that not too many of them would be concentrated in any one place. Notwithstanding the Party’s policy of equality, they must also be kept in their economic station by the Party’s class stance of favouring the poor peasants. Having been deprived of their previous privileges, they must not be allowed to regain them. As “those who were the last to find themselves in difficulty,” the new people should not be the first to reap the rewards of the new society; while the veteran people, as those “who had been in difficulty and had supported the revolution for a long time,” must not be the last to enjoy “social prosperity.”

On the other hand, even while the CPK called on cadre to heighten revolutionary vigilance against “CIAs, pacification agents and spies” who were undercover and carrying out wrecking in various places, saying they must be eliminated to prevent them from inciting feudal and other lazy reactionaries to complain about hardship, it insisted that those who complained but were not undercover enemies were to be given instruction about the importance of working to reconstruct the nation. It warned cadre not to abuse “their authority to decide to execute a human being who makes a mistake, but is not an enemy.” They should conduct a “sharp, tough and tenacious” class struggle against the remnants of enemy ideology, but this should not be conducted in the form of “armed violence” or through a “blood-letting.” They should be on guard against attempts by “traitorous links who were soldiers, police, CIAs, spies, etc.,” among the evacuees to conspire with one another to conduct “propaganda, opposition and sabotage,” but take care to hit only those who were truly enemy agents and not to harm others. The watchword was “don't attack the forest, attack the tiger.” End of year 1975 indoctrination reiterated that with the new people in general, solidarity should and could be maintained because they were among the 90% of the population that should be considered revolutionary, even if many of them comprised the
5% of the population that was deemed counter-revolutionary. Although a stance of class struggle must be applied against enemies, and cadre must pay attention to eliminating spies, pacification agents and kinh, the Party line was one of close solidarity with and among both veteran and new people, who were to be considered a single popular bloc. Cadre must be forgiving of the shortcomings of both veteran and new people.\textsuperscript{145}

In tandem with this, the Party argued that agricultural production, not indiscriminate killing, was the key to defeating “all the covert and overt schemes” of the enemies of the revolution, including feudal and bourgeois remnants as well as imperialism and its local lackeys of foreigners. Revolutionary vigilance would be served by ensuring that cooperatives launched “storming attacks to put up paddy dikes, dig canals [and] make dams.”\textsuperscript{146} This was in line with a Party ordering of priorities in this post-17 April period that put “the duty of building socialism” higher than “the duty of defending the country”\textsuperscript{147} by “fending off the enemy that is boring from within.”\textsuperscript{148} Success in agriculture would permanently finish off the feudal and bourgeois classes politically and solidify solidarity among the people.\textsuperscript{149} No enemy would be able to create splits among the people, who would give ever more solid support to cooperatives and the collective system generally\textsuperscript{150} because they would be eating what the Party stipulated as its annual target (rice) ration: either to 15 thăng per person (one thăng = 24 kilograms), depending on their labour category. To make all this happen would require mobilizing all new and veteran people fully for labour and deploying them effectively. No one should be left “inactive.” Everyone must be engaged in “constant storming attacks” in all seasons.\textsuperscript{151} Echoing wartime policy about not being overly reliant on organizational methods to achieve Party goals, cadre were also admonished that in putting the people to work, they must rely on propaganda, not coercion, and take care not to undermine solidarity among them.\textsuperscript{152}

A CPK study document, probably dating from around November 1975, brought all this together in elaborating to cadre how “to get a grip with regard to the true nature of the Party’s revolutionary state power and the true nature of the Party’s dictatorship of the proletariat, in order to have a more clear-cut perspective on the problem of revolutionary state power and the work of defending and strengthening the Party’s revolutionary state power in all circumstances, in accordance with the Party’s dictatorship of the proletariat, absolutely not allowing other classes or enemies and adversaries to retake state power from the Party.” It tasked them to ensure that the CPK’s state power always remained “a state power belonging to the Party and the proletariat and for serving the interests of the worker-peasantry” by guaranteeing that it was never put “at the service of other classes, be they the petty bourgeoisie, the feudalists or the bourgeoisie.” This meant that, for the time being, they must be denied political rights, which they could only enjoy once they proved themselves “able to transform themselves into worker-peasants in accordance with their duty of serving this state power.”\textsuperscript{153} Cadre were to be wary of the situation of a chaotic intermingling of worker-peasants and feudal-bourgeois elements, being on guard not to allow the latter “to wander around as they please,” hoarding rice, stockpiling salt and secreting other things away.\textsuperscript{154} However, the immediate CPK requirement was for cadre to attempt to “re-educate, organize and refashion” the former “bourgeois and feudal-landlord elements” whose evacuation to the countryside had made them into “new peasants” and must now be further transformed “into worker-peasants.” On the other hand, the document explained, while the CPK had “the potential to rectify a number of them,” others among them would “not rectify themselves, and these will look for one opportunity after another to oppose the
It was necessary to “heighten revolutionary vigilance everywhere” to guard against their possible attacks on cooperatives, which could be part of an enemy attack on Cambodia as a whole. This was part of the need for the CPK to combine rectification of former “bourgeoisie and various other oppressing classes” with imposition upon them of a dictatorship of the proletariat “denying them the rights and freedoms by which they might reconsolidate their strength and attack the proletarian state power.” The document stressed that one of the most important rights denied to them was to be a cadre in a cooperative, much less a member of a cooperative committee. Otherwise, their anger at being overthrown and vindictively-minded thoughts of retaking state power might be realized by joining “together with enemies coming from the outside to attack us.” In particular, the CPK had to take action to deal with “enemies” who were “attacking the cooperatives in order to dissolve them, having only mutual aid teams, and restore markets” and towns.

Again, however, the document stressed it was imperative for CPK cadre, from the “higher-ups” down to the districts and cooperatives to understand the necessity to “make distinctions” among the petty bourgeois, bourgeois, feudalist-landlord and “mandarin” elements among the masses in order, to the greatest extent possible, to “take them as friends on the side of the revolution.” Even if they were prohibited from managing cooperates, cadre must not “push them away” by peremptorily “chewing them out saying they are good-for-nothing and telling them to just get lost.” Doing so indiscriminately would only make “it possible for enemies to attack and gather them in, resulting in a loss of forces” for the CPK. Thus, the document said:

In order to gather forces, we must know how to re-educate and refashion those who are tending towards contradiction with the cooperatives, who moan either about eating in common or working hard. It would be no gain for us to smash this group. Such a state power would not yet know how to gather forces. The people will get fed up and be scared of such a state power, and therefore would not dare to express views, starting with about transplanting on up, the people would not dare to express views. If we were to have the transplant on dry land, they would just do it. This would constitute a loss of forces for national construction and national defense.

Instead, the Party must make every effort to win over those who are vacillating and to refashion every last one of those who are confused, such that they begin to vacillate and advance to being neutral. With those who are in opposition simply because they tag along behind others, we should also make every effort to win over, re-educate and explain things to them in order to isolate the contemptible traitors. Thus, if our politics are smooth, among 10,000 people, only one or two will be rotten, but if we are not smooth, then among 10,000, 100-200 will be rotten.
This notion of isolating the enemy was also presented as requiring, among other things, winning over other forces such as students and petty civil servants to the side of the revolution, rendering the enemy incapable of effecting anything it wanted to do.\textsuperscript{163}

More generally, cadre were admonished that they must avoid the evident tendency to use the dictatorship of the proletariat simply to “issue orders and instructions subjectively, without collecting the views of the masses.”\textsuperscript{164} In any case, the key was to make sure “the people have homes in which to live, food to eat, clothes to wear and the right to schooling,” so they would be “pleased and satisfied” with the revolution.\textsuperscript{165} Thus, cadre were taught in late 1975, it was wrong to think that implementation of the dictatorship of the proletariat meant just “arresting and killing.” Although it required strengthening class struggle, any such repression that adversely affected the interests of the revolution “created contradictions and served enemy policies.” Even “hot” class struggle was primarily ideological.\textsuperscript{166}

Continuing his comments to the ECCC about such matters, Nuon’s account of Party policy vis-à-vis evacuees is that new people were supposed to be “joined with others to work and joined with others to eat while studying from the cooperatives in the countryside to be transformed from persons who did not know how to labour into labourers, into laboring persons.” He says these new people were to be well-looked after, well-fed and to benefit from “education for solidarity, that new and veteran people shouldn’t squabble with each other, saying this person is a 17 April, that person is a veteran base person, that person is a new base person.” However, Nuon says, only “some of the cooperatives were able to achieve” such goals, and in some places there was not enough for all to eat. He attributes such shortcomings at least in part to the presence of “knaves, traitors and no-good elements” among both the evacuees and the Party “who were wrecking the cooperatives,” including by spoiling relations between evacuees and local residents.\textsuperscript{167} Or, as he has similarly recounted events, from “the villages and subdistricts on up,” cadre were supposed to educate both the new people who had just been evacuated and the base people who were veteran residents of the CPK’s previously liberated zones “not to squabble and discriminate, because we are all Khmer, that whatever there was to eat should be shared out, and not to squabble and discriminate because this person was a veteran and that a newcomer. However, there were also scoundrels who engaged in provocation and aggravation, saying this group was new and that group was veteran. So, there was this problem of breaking up solidarity, a real problem. There were good ones who understood, but it was very complicated.”\textsuperscript{168} The result, according to Nuon, was supposed to “be mutual solidarity, mutual affection and sharing out of whatever there was to be had. But there was no avoiding, no escape from scoundrels, like those about which I have informed you, but the majority was good.”\textsuperscript{169} Again conceding food shortages, Nuon nevertheless asserted that the available supply “was sufficient to survive via mutual sharing,” according to the Party line that those cooperatives in need were supposed to be helped by other cooperatives in a position to do so.\textsuperscript{170}

Thus, Nuon declared to the Court, post-17 April 1975 Party policy was to “eliminate only those human beings who were wrecking the nation and could not be rectified.” He indicates it was not to immediately eliminate all “no-good persons,” who were supposed to be re-educated via two or three reminders, admonitions and self-criticism sessions; then reviews of their perspective on the revolution and being subjected to repeated attempts at rectification and refashioning, before any other action was taken.\textsuperscript{171} In principle, he affirms, “revolution is about
refashioning human beings, not smashing them,” but also states that it did smash “those persons who had been rectified, helped with re-education to rectify them many times …. but who could not be rectified,” thus putting them into the category of “vicious incorrigibles.”

1976

In January 1976, CPK policies of re-educating no-good elements and smashing enemies were codified in the Democratic Kampuchea Constitution. As the Closing Order states, it referred “to two forms of activity that posed a threat to the State and their corresponding penalties: ‘[d]angerous activities in opposition to the people’s State must be condemned to the highest degree’, whereas ‘[o]ther cases are subject to constructive reeducation in the framework of the State’s or people’s organizations.’ A person suspected of the former category of activity was deemed to be an ‘enemy’ who had to be ‘smashed’, whereas a person falling within the latter category was considered a ‘bad-element’ who would be reeducated as prescribed by the Constitution.” Internally-articulated policy made a similar distinction between, on the one hand, “the enemy,” that is, “the CIA enemy,” and those who were “opponents in league with the enemy” and, on the other hand, “those who have not internalized the revolutionary movement,” including “new people who don’t yet understand things” and “no-good elements” subject to re-education was. In this period, the Party also reiterated in 1976 the proclaimed ideal with regard to the treatment of new people, recalling and declaring that:

After the liberation of the entire country, when it fell to the entire Cambodian nation and people, under the correct and great clear-sighted leadership of the Party, to carry on with the making of the current socialist revolution and construction of socialism in today’s Cambodia, the people and the masses still played the most important role. Immediately after the liberation of the entire country, the people and the masses, under the Party’s leadership, were those who fought day and night to increase production, overcoming all obstacles and enduring hardships and suffering of every kind and being able to sort out all types of shortages so that there would be foodstuff to support themselves and support the more than two million people who had recently been evacuated from all the towns. Our people not only sacrificed their mental and physical strength to go on night-and-day offensives to increase production, but the brothers and sisters all shared the food from their own mouths to support the newly-evacuated people from the cities, shared their houses for the new evacuees to live in, shared their medicines to treat the new evacuees, and even shared their physical and mental strength and their sentiments to help educate and govern the new evacuees politically, ideologically, and organizationally. In short, immediately after emerging from war, our people sacrificed with all their hearts and minds to join in sorting out the difficulties and the shortages that our people were temporarily passing through.

The Party further asserted that through such sacrifices and efforts, the Cambodian countryside was “rapidly changing” for the better, at the same time that the population there was
“also rapidly changing, both rural residents and those who came out of the towns.” They were “being transformed in hot movements, that is, in the movements to put up dams, dig canals and farm rainy and dry season paddy, movements that are fashioning a new standpoint, a new weltanschauung, new technologies and new forces.” To sustain this process, Party cadre must strive “to achieve the full potential for sorting out the living standards of members of cooperatives and the needs of the Cooperatives,” and new people should be considered a “force for national construction” who were to be re-educated, re-fashioned and taught the discipline of the revolution through work. They were supposed to benefit from improving popular living standards at the same time that their labour was supposed to be mobilized alongside that of veteran people to construct new paddy dike systems and feeder canals on 30% of the country’s lowland paddy fields, reconfiguring them for cooperative production. This was the first phase of the Party’s plans for achieving the target of producing three tons per hectare per paddy crop planted on single-crop fields during the remainder of 1976. As described in official accounts, the labourers worked from morning to as late as 11 PM despite “shortages of clothing, shortages of food, and shortages of medicines,” and were supposed to toil under these conditions without complaint. The food shortages arose, by the Party’s account, from March 1976, when rice harvested in late 1975 at the end of that year’s paddy farming season began to run out. Policy called for this to be overcome by planting and eating supplementary non-paddy crops to tide the population over until 1976 paddy became available at the end of that year and beginning of 1977, but in September 1976, the Party admitted this solution had not been entirely successful.

In this context, the Party had also begun discussing problems of with the character of its local cadre, expressing concern at what it described as the misbehavior of some vis-à-vis the people, accusing them of “feudalist leadership,” that is, leading simply “by giving orders in the old feudal style.” It furthermore complained that some cadre were oblivious to the shortages, hunger and illnesses of the people they were supposed to be leading, were failing to serve the people because they were not sorting out such problems, were not properly organizing agricultural production, were effectively reserving the best land and most farm implements for themselves while leaving the people to farm by hand, were instead hording foodstuffs and supplies that were supposed to be distributed to the people but which they were keeping for their own use and that of their families and “cliques,” thereby creating a situation in which food-short people were falling ill, then blaming the people for problems by accusing them of not working fast enough and not meeting the cadre’s “personal objectives,” all of which had the effect of allowing the enemy to incite the people against the revolution, to oppose it or even rebel against it, instead of treating the people in a manner that would ensure all the forces of the popular masses supported the revolution. Demanding these shortcomings be corrected, the Party issued instructions that cadre must go all-out urgently to improve “the living standards of the people,” insisting that rice and other nutritional essentials such as salt must be rationed equally to all people in all areas, that proper shelter must be provided to people mobilized to labour at worksites, and that pending the provision of modern medications, large quantities of traditional nostrums must be produced to keep the people healthy. It reiterated that the population must not be mobilized for this work simply by “organizational methods,” but must be persuaded by propaganda and education programmes to participate in it on account of their own enthusiasm for building the country and socialism.
Meanwhile, although cadre were being admonished to “pay attention to providing frequent political, ideological and organizational re-education and nurturing for” all people in the cooperatives, they were still to focus in particular on “the brother and sister poor and lower-middle peasantry” in order to “rapidly increase their political competence both in terms of revolutionary standpoint and in terms of their capacity to lead, govern and manage all the work of the cooperatives.”

This was so that the cooperatives would “more and more strengthen their nature of being Party’s tool of proletarian dictatorship over all other classes” and prevent those classes from winning in any potential “contest for leadership of the cooperatives.” To ensure this, the Party continued to train cadre to discriminate politically against new people in general, although it now also provided for exceptions in the case of evacuees of basic class background.

A Party document elucidated that:

Currently all the types of contradiction are totally concentrated in the cooperatives. Severe class combat is concentrated in the cooperatives: the battles between capitalism and socialism, between the private and collective standpoints, and between every aspect of the Party’s line of socialist revolution and building socialism and the line of opposing socialist revolution and building socialism. These battles are daily, are the hottest battlefield and are concrete, battles in eating, clothing and living, battles in the productive labour of putting up paddy dikes, digging canals and farming dry and rainy season paddy, battles to achieve the Party’s duty of achieving three tons of paddy per hectare, battles to sort out the people’s standard of living, sort out preserved fish, clothing and so on.

This analysis was based on the Party’s general position on class and class struggle, which it restated in around September 1976, with a view, it said, to “launching storming attacks to complete the Party’s 1976 plan and to set up conditions for fulfilling the Party’s plans for 1977 to achieve great victories and great leaps forward” in socialist revolution and the construction of socialism. It explained that the Party’s paradigmatic presupposition was that “class contradictions and class struggle will be protracted,” that is was wrong to think that just “because the Party holds power nationwide and the working class and the peasantry hold power nationwide, there is no more class struggle.” Instead, it reaffirmed, although “the feudal class and the bourgeoisie have indeed collapsed,” what it termed the “quintessential reality” of a class contradiction with them persisted “ideologically, in terms of stance and in terms of class anger.” This meant that “the quintessential reality of socialist revolution” was “the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and other exploiting classes” requiring a constant effort to eliminate “everything that is bourgeois, everything that is of the exploiting classes and everything that is private property” in order to make the socialist revolution advance rapidly.

Thus, it remained the Party’s analysis that neither a feudal class, a bourgeoisie, a petty bourgeoisie, an intellectual stratum nor an administrative mandarinate any longer existed “in organized form” in Cambodia, their individual remnants having been incorporated into the
peasantry as new peasants, while the only other class that existed was the working class. 193 Nevertheless, what the Party called “the class content of the petty bourgeois, bourgeois and of landlord and noble feudalism” continued to exist in Cambodian society. Indeed, the Party position was now that, despite its efforts and achievements since 17 April 1975, “the quintessential reality and the class content of the toppled and disbanded” ruling class persisted “a lot.” Its individual remnants still lived “with socialism only because they are organized to do so, because the way they are organized compels them to do so,” because they were “placed under the class dictatorship of the worker-peasant classes,”194 the force of which submerged them such that they were “unable to wriggle out” politically. 195 Moreover, adopting a less optimistic tone than in 1975, the Party’s assessment was now that at best their “their ideological impurities” could only “be gradually cleared up,” and this would only be “possible for some of the elements among them,” whereas “other elements will resist.”196 Party policy was still that it “must re-educate and refashion” the “bourgeois and landlord-feudal elements who have now become new peasants … into worker-peasants,” but the problem was that “a number of them will not change. They will always be on the constant look out for opportunities to oppose the revolution.”197

This meant a fundamental contradiction continued to exist between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie alongside a contradiction between the proletariat and the remnants of “the feudal class comprising landlords and the nobility (subdistrict chiefs, district and provincial governors, civil servants, police and soldiers).” In particular, among the new peasants there were former “petty bourgeois, bourgeois, feudalists, workers and various other labourers” with whom there were still contradictions based on economic class or political grounds. Although some of these individuals might “rectify,” they would not do so “easily.” Overall, the Party said, “a certain number of such elements will rectify, but many others will not,” adding that “even if they die, they will have admonished their children to continue the struggle with Communism.” In addition to these incorrigibles among the new peasants, there were also such persons among the veteran peasants, “starting with the upper-middle peasants and especially with the rich peasants.”198 This explained why conducting the ongoing class struggle “within the bourgeoisie” had proved especially “difficult.”199

Regardless of their class origins, contradictions with those who refused to rectify were “life-and-death contradictions,”200 indicative of the continued existence of “antagonistic contradictions … among the people,” 201 which in turn reflected the underlying, on-going presence in Cambodia’s socialist society of “antagonistic, life-and-death contradictions between the worker-peasants, on the one hand, and the bourgeois and feudal, on the other.” It also explained why, the Party said, “in the grassroots, the majority of the in-contradiction types whom we have been able to apprehend are mostly civil servants, police, soldiers and students,” because such persons were historically those who had acted on behalf of the bourgeoisie and the landlords and were therefore still most likely to do so.202

In reiterating that with regard to such matters, “there are two types of contradictions: internal, secondary contradictions; antagonistic life-and-death contradictions,” the Party nevertheless still called on cadre to be careful not to confuse the two, warning in particular not “go overboard” and thus act so as to make “petty contradictions become antagonistic contradictions.203 The problem, it admitted, was exactly how “not to confuse antagonistic life-and-death contradictions between ourselves and the enemy with internal contradictions existing
among ourselves and among the people,” and thus exactly “how to correctly resolve antagonistic contradictions and also to correctly resolve internal contradictions.”

The Party instructed that there were two ways to resolve antagonistic contradictions:

One is generally reeducation, doing political, ideological and organizational work in the mass milieu in order to reduce the contradictions such that they are not allowed to be constantly acute. However, at the same time, there must also be conscientious organizational measures, conscientious organizational measure of each and every kind.

It explained there were two basic types of organizational measures. The first and “most important” type was to work within already organized collectives, such as cooperatives, “to consolidate, improve and purge what we have organized collectively.” This would not succeed “100% in one go,” and there would in particular be “difficulties with some elements who have never lived collectively,” but with the help of “political and ideological work,” such persons might well “gradually” come around politically as long as Cambodian’s collectivist socialism developed and progressed well enough that they, like the rest of the masses, would see the regime’s distinctive good points: “eating well, working effectively, easy raising of children, security guaranteed.” Other organizational measures were characterized as “subsidiary,” including “political-ideological work together with criticism and refashioning” for those deemed guilty of “petty errors” and apparently to be conducted outside their normal organized collectivities, Finally, for higher levels of alleged transgression, there was “the highest organizational measure,” a Party euphemism for execution, the absolute way of effecting “purges of the enemy among the people to make them clean, good, firm and strong.”

However, this ultimate sanction was described as “a staving off measure, a tactical measure,” one in temporary use as a last resort until those capable of doing so saw the political light, whereas among all the organizational measures:

one measure is basic, that is, implementation of proletarian dictatorship over these types. Our proletarian dictatorship with regard to these types means not being frivolous about them. Give freedom to the worker-peasant people. The feudalists and the bourgeoisie must be kept with a narrow framework. We must be crystal clear about to whom freedom is given and to whom not. Be careful not to allow the feudalists-landlords to wander off all the time hither and yon, such as looking for salt, roots for making medicine or tending cattle. If these types are always wandering around, they will make contact with each other. We must educate our cooperatives to be vigilant with these types.

Thus, the Party maintained, by strengthening the worker-peasant alliance and application of “a dictatorial state power over” ex-ruling class and other upper-strata elements, the incorrigible elements would “gradually be isolated and lose their strength,” and it would be possible to treat the contradictions with the others in need of rectification as “subsidiary internal”
ones arising from their temporarily low level of “political enlightenment” and resolvable by persistent re-education.\textsuperscript{211} The Party repeatedly stressed this point that “internal contradictions must be resolved as internal contradictions with our flesh and blood not opposing the revolution, but in contradiction because of a lack of understanding. These must be resolved by constant reeducation.”\textsuperscript{212}

In the meantime, the Party must “not allow the various exploiting classes that have already been toppled and disbanded to retake state power.”\textsuperscript{213} To prevent this, it must “heighten the spirit of revolutionary vigilance in every location”\textsuperscript{214} and resolutely impose the dictatorship of the proletariat upon them. This meant “democratic rights and freedoms” continued to exist only for the worker-peasant people in order to deny remnants of other classes “the right or freedom to reconsolidate their strength or to attack the proletarian state power.” In particular, they were still not allowed to become cooperative cadre,\textsuperscript{215} otherwise they might be able “to join together with the foreign enemies” of the revolution coming from the outside to attack it.\textsuperscript{216} They could only be granted political rights once they had become more fully “transformed into worker-peasants,” after which they could be of service to the revolutionary state power.\textsuperscript{217}

This same Party exposition also elaborated concerns expressed earlier in 1976 about the political quality of its own cadre. A basic problem was that, organizationally speaking, the revolutionary ranks constituted a kind of class stratum,\textsuperscript{218} one existing in a society in which it was subject to “bourgeois and feudal influences,” such as a “recurring habit of wanting to exploit” others.\textsuperscript{219} To overcome and expunge this, the Party stressed, it was “imperative to refashion our ranks in every location,” among other things by ensuring that district and lower-level local cadre stayed “among the worker-peasants in the sense of sharing weal and woe with the worker-peasants, engaging in labour work with the worker-peasants.”\textsuperscript{220} The Party had to be concerned about the existence within the revolutionary ranks of persons who “must be sorted out in order that they go engage in productive activities with the worker-peasants,” because if they were “not sorted out in this manner,” there would be contradictions.\textsuperscript{221} Moreover, there were already cases of “antagonistic contradictions inside the Party.”\textsuperscript{222} This meant there “must be organizational measures to purge” them from the Party’s “state power to make it clean, firm and strong.”\textsuperscript{223} They could be subjected to re-education within the Party, be transferred to another position, be removed from the Party, or be punished with “the highest organizational measure.”\textsuperscript{224}

By at least October 1976, the developing shifts in Party policy were crowned by a fundamental change in the Party’s general line that redefined the Party’s number one duty as defending the revolution from its enemies, above all its internal enemies, with the duty of socialist construction relegated to a lower priority.\textsuperscript{225} To implement this, the Party put forward a plan for 1977 to “systematically to purge and sweep enemies cleanly away” nationwide, with the Party everywhere “proceeding from the same standpoint” and operating on the basis of the notion that in order to adhere to “the necessity of revolutionary vigilance,” it “should always consistently have mastery in advance.” This appears to have meant analyzing the situation to anticipate future threats and “take correct measures to deal with” them “in advance.”\textsuperscript{226} It was accompanied by articulation of a three-fold categorization of politically problematic people. The least problematic were “those who have merely been incited by the enemy, merely believed the enemy incitement,” who should be dealt with by re-fashioning, evidently within their units of
organization, “to get them no longer to believe the enemy,” at least “as a first step.” Those who were more problematic should be sent away to “education schools,” where they must be “educated again and again.” Finally, those who were outright dangerous must be “absolutely purged.”

In this context, cadre were supposed to guard against either being more violent or less vigilant than the Party wanted, against either being too quick to smash others or feeling sorry for victims of execution. They must not fail to conduct political education, nor simply rely “on beatings to death whenever there were situations,” neglecting “to resolve them by any other method.” At the same time, they must not make the mistake of doing nothing, no matter what anyone did wrong, adopting a stance of sympathy for wrong-doers, which was condemned as a “bourgeois” and “liberal” tendency. More broadly, given the Party’s new priorities, they must not put focus so much on achieving the CPK’s agricultural production goals that they gave too little attention to the top requirement of defense of the revolution, which was derided as the mistake of pacifism characterized by a lack of revolutionary vigilance. Thus, Party policy suggested a need for intensified searches for remnant “class enemies” who must be suppressed, along with other “enemies buried among the people,” but also indoctrinated cadre not to “behave as if all new people were enemies” who could never be trusted “to make political progress, to acquire political consciousness, or to solve the problem of livelihood.” Behaving in this latter manner was “a huge misinterpretation” of the Party line that would wrongly result in a failure to win over people politically to the side of the revolution and thereby failure to get them to carry out the tasks assigned to the people by the Party.

1977

During the first half of 1977, cadre were taught to beware of no-good elements everywhere, because it was among them that undercover CIAs and kinh enemies recruited networks, but that implementing prioritization of the task of “defending the country” still required differentiation between “enemy elements” against whom severe measures were necessary and those who were “liberals” or were somehow beholden to the enemy who must be re-educated. Nevertheless, the emphasis seemed to be shifting towards the rising threat supposedly posed by the more dangerous elements among those with whom there were “antagonistic contradictions,” like purported “CIA, Yuon [Vietnamese] and revisionist enemies,” with whom “mere education” was insufficient. Those involved in such “treasonous networks” must be the target of the most “absolute purges” and eliminated, even if political and ideological education should still be used on elements with whom there were only “internal contradictions.”

Within the revolutionary ranks, the apparently hardening if formally still nuanced CPK line meant those labelled “contemptible traitors” had to be “swept clean.” Those against whom this absolute measure was applied included cadre who allegedly opposed the Party line by adopting a policy “stand of coexistence between the private and the collective,” refusing to maintain a proper boundary between collectivism, on the one hand, and “things private and things personal,” on the other, thereby creating a situation in which “enemies were swarming all over” some locations, and which adversely affected production there. Thus, during the three-month period from mid-January to mid-April 1977, according to a presentation by “the Comrade Party Representative” on the second anniversary of 17 April, the Party had won “initial victories” in an offensive to defend the country, the revolutionary state power and Cambodia’s
collective and socialist systems by purging the Party, that is by fundamentally smashing those condemned as internal enemies who were traitors to the revolution, members of alleged networks of CIA, KGB and Vietnamese agents embedded in the Party and the army to sabotage the revolution. The 17 April anniversary speaker linked this victory over enemies within to possibilities for success of the on-going “offensive to achieve the Party’s three tons and six tons for 1977,” that is, three tons of paddy per hectare on single-cropped fields and six tons of paddy per hectare on double-cropped fields during the upcoming agricultural year, taking advantage of the construction of irrigation waterworks to make such yields and multiple-cropping possible. He declared purges must continue, explaining that although “big and medium apparatuses” of the CIA, KGB and Vietnamese agent networks embedded in the revolutionary ranks had “fundamentally been smashed” and their remnants “fundamentally scattered,” the Party “must continue to attack and trample them” and so “must be constantly on the offensive against them during 1977 to smash them even more, so they cannot raise their heads.”

Concurrently, at the grassroots level, enemy activities were attributed in particular to “former soldiers and police and those of military rank, such as second and first lieutenants, captains and even majors” of the Khmer Republic who had previously managed to conceal themselves among the population of cooperatives, despite the attempts of the authorities to identify them, but who had now “become visible through their activities” and therefore been arrested and smashed. The rising offensive against allegedly incorrigible enemies within also targeted those among suspect groups like new people and Cham who were categorized as “traitors” on account of their various alleged wrecking, immoral and other “activities” and were therefore smashed locally as part “of storming attacks to defend the country” by “eliminating enemies who are opposed to socialism.” Meanwhile, other “17 April elements” were purged by removing them from minor positions of authority, in accordance with the Party line prohibiting their employment as cadre in even the most trivial capacities.

In accordance with the notion that smashing enemies was a priority over organizing production, the Party in July 1977 elaborated its argument that this was because the former was a prerequisite for the success of the latter. It proclaimed that the “traitors boring holes from within the Party and inside the revolutionary ranks” and “the dangerous elements attacking and wrecking the revolution from the cooperatives” who had recently been smashed or otherwise purged were the ones responsible for previous failures to achieve agricultural productivity and production goals. Purportedly, “when those traitors were still around, even when there was water, it was as if there was no water”; and “even when the ground was fertile enough for two crops, it was as if there was no fertility.” The Party said their eradication had created much improved preconditions for achievement of the paddy production goal of three and six tons per hectare and predicted the harvest of late 1977-early 1978 would be “multiplied ten times, one hundred times,” even though the weather so far in 1977 had been unfavourable. However, it insisted that to ensure success, cadre must continue “sweeping cleanly away the embedded traitors boring holes from within and purging the dangerous elements to totally and absolutely rid them from” its ranks and continue “purging and consolidating every organization in the cooperatives at every work spearhead.” It also instructed that any location where there were food shortages must resolve them “based on the fundamental stance of self-reliance” by cultivating more food crops itself and whipping up “mightier” production movements among its own population.
Also in July 1977, “a representative of the Party Organization” elaborated and qualified the Party’s policies on the purge, reconstitution and consolidation of Party authority in order that, during the remainder of the year, the revolution would be able “to absolutely achieve three tons and six tons, to achieve attacking and cleaning out the enemy, and to absolutely build Party leadership.” He explained that the key to achieving all Party objectives, including sorting out the living standards of the people and feeding them according to the Party-stipulated ration, was “consolidating the Party and refashioning the leadership at every echelon.” Recalling that “a significant number” of Party members at all levels had been purged during the first half of 1977, he alleged the victims had built up traitorous networks of subordinates serving their non-Party policies and in particular put embedded enemies or persons from classes other than the poor and lower-middle peasantry in control of cooperatives. He said the cadre who had successfully passed through the screening that had brought about the purges were the Party’s hardest, strongest and best members, most capable of leading the masses to defend and build the country. He also said that gaps in the authority structure resulting from the purges should be filled by promotion and new recruitment of good elements, which he specified meant they should only be drawn from “good locations that have no traitorous elements” and whose biographies must be carefully screened, not taken on faith, to ensure that no embedded enemies were selected or promoted. Class criteria must be taken into account, selecting from the basic poor and lower-middle peasant classes. Those selected must also be politically clean, that is, “not indebted to or entangled with the enemy.” A particular task for the second half of 1977 was to further purge cooperative authorities of embedded enemies and elements who were not from the poor and lower-middle peasant strata, replacing them with the requisite good elements. These same poor and lower-middle peasants were also the ones who should be most relied upon to “defend the rear battlefield” pursuant to the Party’s military line. To ensure this, they must be better educated to “have class anger, have class fight, and have a firm class stance,” to realize that unless they had “class anger toward the class enemy and anyone making propaganda” against the revolution, and took measures against such persons, they would lose power and become victims of bourgeois exploitation again.

In September 1977, Pol Pot authoritatively restated the Party line in his speech on Party history and policy. He declared that the victory of 17 April 1975 had created a situation in which the 90% of the population who comprised “the masses of workers, peasants and other labourers” became a force that had “pushed and pulled” the remaining 10% of the population, people of bourgeois, feudal and other class or other strata origin, to participate in or at least go along with the revolution, specifying that former members of the petty bourgeoisie, including students and “intellectuals of every kind,” were still allies of the working class and peasantry. He affirmed that of the 10% in question, 8%-9% were “for the revolution” for patriotic or material reasons. This tally that 98%-99% of the population was on the side of the revolution was premised on a narrative according to which successes in the construction of socialism meant, in general, the whole of the population was living in equality at the level of old society middle peasants, such that the standard of living of the former poor and lower-middle peasants had been substantially raised, that of the former rural and urban middle classes had somewhat improved, and that of the former upper strata had fallen but was sufficient.

On the other hand, Pol declared:
antagonistic life-and-death contradictions still exist in the new Cambodian society because there are still enemies who are the various links of imperialist and international reactionary intelligence who are surreptitiously implanted to conduct activities to wreck our revolution and also a handful of other reactionary elements who are continuing to conduct counter-revolutionary activities and activities to wreck our Cambodian revolution. All of them are small in number, comprising one or two percent of our people. Some of these contemptibles are striving to implant themselves by taking the form of being ordinary people, while some are openly conducting opposition activities. We consider all such counter-revolutionary, traitorous and revolution-wrecking elements not to be people, but to be enemies of a democratic Cambodia, of the Cambodian revolution and of the Cambodian people. We therefore resolve the contradictions with them via the measures that we must use to sort things out with the enemy. That is, we make distinctions among them: re-educating, refashioning and winning over those elements that can be won over and rectified to rejoin the side of the people; neutralizing the vacillating elements to prevent them from wrecking the revolution; and isolating and eliminating only the smallest number of elements who are vicious and absolutely opposed to the revolution and people and who are in cahoots with external enemies to kill our nation, people and revolution.  

Speaking in organizational terms, he added that “with regard to the small handful of enemies and adversaries and of reactionary elements who are opposing the revolution, wrecking the revolution and acting as agents of imperialism and international reactionaries to kill their own nation, their own people and their own revolution, we implement a thorough and absolute dictatorship of the proletariat.”

In late 1977, the Party persisted in its insistence that not all individual members of the formerly dominant feudal class, bourgeoisie and rich peasant stratum should be treated as enemies, “so long as they go with us and not with the enemy.” It called for them to be re-educated to love the nation and to see revolution’s progress, so they could be gathered in “more and more” as “tactical forces” and “assisting forces” for the revolution. It said that even if “a certain number of them will not come over,” their children and grandchildren were more likely to. Nevertheless, at a Party conference in November 1977, amidst escalating border combat with Vietnam, the Party Centre again stipulated “defence” as the most important task for 1978. The Party also warned that cadre who proved unable to defend the country would be considered “cadre of the enemy,” although some who were basically good and loved the Party and the revolution might fail only because they had been “duped by the enemy” or were too “soft and malleable.” The former were “concealed enemies” against whom “it would be dangerous not to take measures in time,” whereas among the latter, some could be refashioned into good cadres, others not. Those who could not be strengthened must be removed and sent to fulfil duties
“secondary importance.” The criteria of performance, not least with regard to national defence, must be applied at all levels within the revolutionary ranks.

Then, when the Vietnamese launched a large-scale incursion into Cambodian territory in late 1977, the Party issued circulars instructing all locations track down and sort out all “no-good elements” and “hooligans” who were allegedly engaged in wrecking, making propaganda against and otherwise sabotaging the revolution and thus deemed to be enemy agents acting on behalf of the Vietnamese and the CIA, many of whom were subsequently said to have been exposed during the Vietnamese attacks. At an end of 1977 annual review and setting of tasks for 1978, the Party warned that although its year-long campaign to systematically sweep its enemies cleanly away had inflicted many defeats on them, forcing other enemy remnants to lie low, cadre must “firmly grasp” the continued existence everywhere of “inherently acute” life-and-death contradictions with enemy elements, characterized as CIA, “Soviet” and Vietnamese forces, lying in wait to resume activities, along with “opportunists and no-good elements.”

The measures taken during 1977 were said to have “further dissolved and dispersed” the former exploiting classes and created a situation in which former members of the feudal class, the bourgeoisie and the rich peasantry were rendered “incapable of resurrecting as private individuals.” This was asserted in the context of the Party’s claims that it had achieved a rapid elevation of popular living standards and that whole of the 99% of the population living in the countryside enjoyed economic equality, despite food shortages, which in it described as “severe” in a few places. It asserted that given the overall progress, the former landlords and rich peasants among the veteran people who had been living under a revolutionary administration for a long time now supported the revolution, and that the “majority” of the new people had patriotically come round to realizing that the revolution was a good thing for Cambodia.

It nevertheless warned that remnants of the old society were still “incessantly pulling” for a return to privatism, including a return to eating at home instead of in the cooperatives’ collective canteens, and that such “non-proletarian elements” still must not be allowed to penetrate the Party’s state power at any level. It called for “political-ideological measures” as part of a programme of “constant education of the people” to convince them that “the collectivist regime of socialism is good and beautiful” and “serves the people.” However, it indicated that in some case re-education would be insufficient, and “pre-emptive organizational methods” would be necessary,” in particular against those who were enemies because they opposed socialist revolution and were taking measures to destroy it, or whom it could be foreseen would do so. These enemy “maggots in our flesh” comprised “only a small handful,” but must be “dug out.”

1978

Thus for 1978, “defense” remained the predominant task, and the Party proclaimed that before the Vietnamese attack it had been lax in about eliminating “all types of enemies” within, who had therefore been allowed to “expand the traitor forces in the ranks of our revolution, among our people and in the army.” It demanded that any remaining “must be attacked and eliminated and absolutely swept cleanly away” and action taken to preclude this
from happening again by continuing purging and sweeping cleanly away within the ranks and “the entire national society.” Party policy was still “to make the fewest possible enemies,” but veteran and new cadre must “be vigilant about no-good elements among the Party’s ranks, our ranks and the people” in order to “pre-emptively ambush” enemies who might “divert the masses along a road different from the line of the Party.” They could be identified, the Party said, by the extent to which their political and other activities “before and during the war and since liberation” demonstrated they were “staunch open opponents of the revolution belonging to staunchly organized networks,” bearing in mind that “any element” could be an enemy.

In a new speech, Pol reiterated that the core duties of Party members placed defense above socialist construction, and that, in the realm of defense, attacking Cambodian enemies within was more important than fighting the Vietnamese enemies without, because, he insisted, foreign aggressors would never succeed militarily if domestic enemies were smashed. However, Pol stressed again that the Party line was not “to just keep on smashing, keep on sweeping clean in a disorderly way,” but to differentiate between “enemies” against whom the Party must be absolute and “the confused ones” who could be re-educated or refashioned. The first step with regard to Party members who revealed themselves as “no-good elements” because they deviated from the Party line was to attempt to re-fashion them, although if they nevertheless did not reform, they were to be “purged.” Other Party instructions admonished that it was “necessary to continue everywhere to sweep enemies boring from within cleanly away,” but it was also imperative not to unnecessary blow up internal contradictions into antagonistic ones, as that would only benefit the enemy.

On the occasion of 17 April in 1978, Pol reaffirmed that amidst what he said was a further rise in living standards, 90% of the population, those of the best class origin, were solidly with the revolution and constituted its strategic forces, as did a number of “revolutionaries” of national bourgeois and petty bourgeois (including intellectual) class origin, plus other revolutionary elements who had originally been “progressives.” According to Pol’s further enumeration, an additional 8% of the population were “medium” forces of the revolution, who were waging revolution even if not strongly. Designated as the third force were those described as “half-baked,” who could not be relied upon to side with the revolution, being in need of further refashioning and of seeing further economic progress in order to be convinced to do so. Finally, Pot declared, there were the revolution’s opponents and enemies, who he said were less than one in a thousand Cambodians, totaling less than 5,000 out of a national population he put at eight million. This small number, he stressed, could not overthrow the revolution, even if they could disrupt parts of it.

Meanwhile, policy was also that the “collective worker-peasant masses” must continue “the class struggle in a more vigorous and in-depth manner by trying to eliminate all enemy activities planted inside the country,” building on previous successes at having “eliminated the enemy stooges, continuously smashed and routed all dark schemes and successively countered and eliminated the spying, sabotage and subversion of enemies of all stripes.” The aim was to further transform “the countryside into a strong revolutionary support base” for the war against Vietnam, thereby effectively joining “hands with the frontline” forces engaged in border combat. Achieving this required organizing “a systematic movement to provide defense” for villages and attaching “great importance to tracking down and smashing all criminal enemy” activities, above
all those by “Vietnamese-supporting elements,” who “must be completely smashed and discarded from all our cooperatives and national community.”

Giving pride of place to these tasks also remained necessary to carry out a socialist revolution to make Cambodia a “pure revolutionary socialist country” and to achieve “socialist construction … by leaps and bounds.”

This point was repeated in a May 1978 instruction that achieving the revolution’s economic goals required another “major struggle” against “enemy sabotage,” saying it was unavoidably necessary to fight and suppress enemies “everywhere,” in the paddy fields and elsewhere. A June 1978 statement similarly stressed that achieving the Party’s 1978 economic plan would require further implementation of the Party line on internal defense against covert enemies, specifying that “all units throughout the country must intensify their spirit of vigilance” against such elements. These policy pronouncements were made in the context of a massive purge of the CPK’s East, Northwest, and West Zones, in Sector 103 [of the new North Zone], Sector 25 [of the Southwest Zone], Kratie [Sector 505] and the Party in Phnom Penh itself, in which various “traitorous leading apparti” were smashed along with their “faction,” purges which were explained and hailed in further Party indoctrination in May-July 1978, which alleged the victims were CIA, Yuon and KGB agents.

The Party now concluded that it had previously been “pacifist, complacent and not seething in its class struggle” against enemies, having initially failed to realize the extent to which it was going to be confronted with “unremittingly tense annual combat” with enemies who were more determined than it had expected to “engage unremittingly” in counter-revolutionary activities, against whom it must therefore more resolutely wage “a tough and continuous struggle.” This meant it must strengthen its “class struggle stance such that it is stauncher and hotter in order to eliminate … internal enemies” it had not previously unmasked in the countryside and elsewhere. However, it specified that its concern was neither “ordinary bourgeois or petty bourgeois elements,” nor intellectuals among the latter, but those identified as “CIA, Yuon and KGB agents,” the most dangerous of which were hidden within the revolutionary ranks.

This indoctrination taught that purges within the ranks fulfilled the national defense duty to “attack absolutely and powerfully” such “CIA, Yuon and KGB agents, to attack them and attack them again so they are liquidated and successively liquidated again and again,” completely smashing their “veteran forces,” “remnants” and “new forces.” It declared the Party “must see as key the duty of smashing the domestic enemy” and Party members must understand it as “related to every one of all our other duties,” including raising popular living standards. It blamed previous failures in this regard on internal enemies who it alleged had traitorously botched production plans and thus “wrecked our people’s living standards” while attempting to overthrow the CPK’s collectivist regime and inviting the Vietnamese to attack in order to bring about its collapse. The solution to remaining economic problems and the prerequisite for fending off the Vietnamese militarily in the future was therefore “to carry out shock assaults against block after block of concealed enemies boring from within our Party and revolution,” purges aimed at “overthrowing the concealed state power of those boring from within” in order to organize “a new state power honest and loyal to the Party.”
The broader message was that “sweeping out all categories of concealed enemies boring from within,” including among the “collective masses,” was the key to turning the economic situation around and resuming the economic advance. The Party condemned already purged leading cadre for having “starved the people and made them thirsty” as part of their traitorous schemes to “bring the people into contradiction with the Party” and thus to make it easier for them to overthrow it. However, it also called upon serving cadre “closely to combine the work of sweeping cleanly away concealed enemies boring from within” with “the work of production to raise the standard of living of the people.” This meant they had to pay “attention to sweeping out even more absolutely cleanly the concealed enemies boring from within who are CIA agents – are Yuon agents – are KGB,” whether among the people or within the revolutionary ranks. 274

In July 1978, the CPK suddenly abolished the division of the cooperative population into full-rights, candidate and depositee categories, officially making “everybody … a cooperative member just like everybody else.” It declared this had been made possible by the successful expansion and development of cooperatives since April 1975. However, some members were more equal and others, as membership in the committees leading the cooperatives still required “a staunch revolutionary stand in terms of classness,” which meant committee persons still “must have good classness in class origins.” Criterion regarding previous political connections also remained in place, barring everyone who in the past had somehow been “beholden to the enemy” from becoming a cooperative leader. 275 Thus, policy remained to select only people from the poor and lower middle peasantry – still designated the “basic classes” – to serve as the core of the leadership of cooperatives, because allowing “bad elements” to do so would lead to deviation from the Party line and failure to achieve production goals. 276 Similarly, there is no indication of change from the previous policy according to which only the “progressive” persons selected from the basic classes were to assigned to second-echelon leadership functions in the cooperatives, in charge of overseeing tasks “such as tending cattle and buffalo, planting crops and vegetables, taking care of granaries and warehouses, mending and keeping records of farm tools, cultivating rice, solving the water conservancy problems, providing medical services, caring for children, ensuring hygiene and sanitation, and so on.” 277

In September 1978, Pol once again claimed that 99% of the Cambodian people were “in unity with the CPK,” but that there were still contradictions with “enemy agents who obdurately oppose the Cambodian revolution and people.” He reiterated that enemies comprised “only a small handful” of persons who were “isolated from the whole nation and people,” who were exercising mastery over them at all times. In general, he declared, contradictions should be sorted out on the basis of re-education and refashioning, “relying on forces of the collective people.” 278 However, in the context of on-going armed conflict with Vietnam at the end of 1978, there were renewed calls to elevate the “spirit of revolutionary vigilance and assess and monitor and sweep cleanly away the espionage networks and the agents of the Yuon enemy” among the people and in the revolutionary ranks. Fresh warnings were given against political “pacifism” and economic “constructivism” on the rear battlefield, that is, failing to give to the right first priority to seeking out “the agents of the expansionist territory-swallowing Yuon, the CIA agents of the American imperialists and the KGB agents of the Soviets.” As since 1977, efforts were to be made to “to counter them in advance” at all levels by pre-emptively sweeping them cleanly away, on the basis of the argument that because the Vietnamese were planning to invade again, these internal enemies were about to “move to carry out activities, psychological
warfare, espionage, and sabotage to overthrow our revolutionary state authorities” and had to be smashed before they attempted to do so.279

Section Two: Policies for Villages, Subdistricts and Cooperatives

1970-1975

General CPK policies with regard to class and enemies were replicated with regard to its grassroots authority structures and tasked them and indeed the ordinary population throughout the country to carry out those policies. In particular, they were related to CPK policies of collectivization of agriculture and applied to the “veteran people” who were organized within such structures before April 1975 and the “new people” evacuated into them from Khmer Republic areas from that date. The drive to set up peasant agricultural production cooperatives that the CPK officially declared launched as of May 1973 built on earlier wartime efforts to establish lower levels of peasant cooperation in farming via promotion of the establishment of “solidarity groups for production” or “mutual aid teams.” These formed the basis for the establishment of cooperatives,280 according to Party plans by which the earliest “group cooperatives” would eventually be expanded to form larger collectives.281 From the outset, cooperatives were characterized as organs belonging principally to the poor and lower-middle peasants who enjoyed the right to run them.282 The old society rural poor were generally designated “full-fledged cooperative members” and “assumed revolutionary power” over them 283 according to a system that eventually divided cooperatives members into full-rights, candidate and depositee members.284 The first cooperatives comprised 10 to 15 families, and were motivated by the Party’s desire to increase paddy production.285 During 1973, both low-level and some high-level production cooperatives were established,286 after which they were “developed and expanded gradually” before April 1975,287 with the biggest apparently comprising whole villages.288

They existed alongside a local state power at the village level and below the subdistrict level, the two lowest echelons of a tiered structure of state power contemporaneously described by Ieng Sary has comprising committees which functioned as the state. As he then explained it, "each committee is composed of three, five or seven members according to the importance of its echelon. Each member is assigned one or more specific duties: political, military, security, economic, cultural, and social affairs, etc.” He added that "Each task is simplified to the maximum at each echelon. The number of functionaries is kept low to assure a disciplined political force.”289 He also stressed the “the importance of the committee cadre responsible for ensuring “the development of production,” including via the promotion of the planting of two paddy crops annually,290 something that would require expansion of irrigation to make possible the second, dry season, crop. Thus, in order to increase production, cooperatives deployed labour power for work in the rear291 “to put up dams, dig canals, farm dry and rainy season paddy and also farm strategic crops.” To serve the war effort, they also recruited troops to go into the army and military auxiliaries as transport and medical corpsmen and corps-women.292 Mobilizing the population was the task of Party cadre who were instructed to “go down and weld themselves to the people.”293 Politically, Party policy was that cooperatives empowered the poor and lower-middle peasantry to implement the Party line and get the remnants of other classes to
go along with them. The Party explained that in addition to the organizational attack on the "feudal-bourgeois economic system" which the establishment of cooperatives constituted, the poor and lower-middle peasants were acting through them "to conduct successively victorious battles to stave off and eliminate all the enemy’s pacification tricks intended to worm into and wreck our revolution and people from the inside and intended to assault our revolution from behind." Party cadre were thus told that cooperatives were both a vehicle for instituting the class power of landless, poor and lower-middle peasants and for making possible the eventual mechanization of agriculture. In the meantime, their formation was supposed to facilitate irrigation and thus production. In practice, the Party said, cooperatives would mean food, schools, medicines and clothing for the peasantry. Their ultimate economic success would ensure opposition to collectivization was overcome. However, in the meantime, wartime Party policy was to set up defense forces in the cooperatives that would function pre-emptively to "directly" defend them against enemy kinh, psychological warfare operatives, pacification agents and other infiltrators who might wreck cooperativization before it could succeed. These local defense forces were the chhlôp, translatable as “guerrillas” or “militia,” which throughout the CPK regime operated as the lowest level of the CPK military, at the village and subdistrict levels, and with which cooperatives were from the beginning supposed to cooperate closely “to fight the enemy most vigorously.” As was later explained, they were assigned to general “guard and patrol duty,” but also to attack any “enemy element” they might encounter.

Both the cooperatives that the chhlôp, therefore, were organizational means via which, on the rear battlefield, it was up to the people to “smash all the kinh” and otherwise prevent activities by them and “espionage worms.” The Party was concerned that “the enemy” was making attempts to attack it from behind by infiltrating “pacification agents and kinh one or two at a time, not 1,000 all in one go, but doing the infiltration according to the rule of from small to big.” Its fear was that unless pre-emptive action was taken, “more will be infiltrated, and the number will keep on going up, from four to five to ten,” and “sooner or later, the number will expand to become many, and they will organize systematically, and this could endanger us.” This was why it was necessary to smash them all immediately. For this reason, it expanded “the network of guerillas on the rear battlefield” and firmly grasped the cooperatives in order to prevent them from getting in, and smashing them if they did.” The objective was to build up the cooperatives into solid walls impervious to the enemy. Collectivization and indoctrination was supposed to make the countryside “impenetrable by pacification and espionage agents,” to guarantee that “pacification, espionage and bandit activities” whipped up by “imperialism” and “traitors” were ineffective by ensuring that those who carried them out “were smashed by our cooperatives one after the other.” Thus, the instructions were, “if the enemy infiltrates kinh, we must sort this out immediately, in a timely manner, not allowing them to expand. … We must immediately take measures, that is, to consolidate the guerillas internally and make sure enemies are smashed one after the other.” The ideal was to create a situation in which “by entering into the liberated zones, they are entering our cage,” as a result of which “they must die.” In realization of this, the Party reported that, “As for the bandits, commandos and espionage types infiltrating our liberated zones in little groups in order to conduct activities by worming into and wrecking the revolution and herding away our people, our guerrillas and people have surrounded and smashed them all, one after the other.”
Thus, from their wartime inception, therefore, cooperatives were supposed to contribute “to efforts to smash the enemy,” thereby performing “the military tasks of defending the liberated areas and the revolutionary power of the state and fighting the enemy’s espionage activities and pacification campaigns.” Alongside their paddy growing functions, they carried out “political … attacks against the enemy” pursuant to the CPK line of “an all-round attack on all battlefields throughout the country,” including in the “rear” battlefields on which the cooperatives were set up, and where, as elsewhere, the enemy was to be fought “repeatedly, relentlessly, continuously and powerfully.” They smashed “lackeys” of US imperialism as one of the Party’s organs for a “movement against the enemy,” which “became progressively and undauntedly vigorous and seething through the country in all seasons” and foiled enemy psychological warfare. Official radio broadcasts recalled that “pacification agents, spies and enemy guerrillas were wiped out one after another by the members of our cooperatives,” who frequently captured and did away with people to whom these labels and that of “bandits” were applied, making cooperatives “a powerful force in crushing espionage, pacification and banditry tactics used by the enemy.”

As mentioned above, just before 17 April 1975, the CPK reiterated that the people in its liberated zones would benefit from elimination of enemy kinh and pacification agents, because this would help ensure proper development of cooperatives. It was therefore the duty of the people in the liberated zones to assist cooperative and other cadre to maintain surveillance over kinh, ancien régime soldiers, police and civil servants, hooligans and other likely opponents of cooperativization already in zones under revolutionary administration control, because these were the elements upon which the enemy relied to attack the revolution. Party cadre, for their part, had to report all untoward phenomena, big or small, to the Party Organization.

Post-17 April 1975: Structure and Organization of Grassroots CPK Authority

As has been seen, the CPK’s post-17 April 1975 project for making socialist revolution, constructing socialism and defending the country against internal and external enemies was predicated on the notion that the wartime establishment of cooperatives had already established the “foundation for socialist revolution in the liberated zones,” the existence of which made possible the evacuation of the population previously under Khmer Republic administration. Cooperatives were considered to embody “the strength of a worker-peasant alliance” that was supposed to be “deeply rooted … in every grassroots village and subdistrict” and through which Cambodia’s “people and in particular our poor and lower-middle peasantry directly rule state power.” They were tasked with leading the “battles in the productive labour of putting up paddy dikes, digging canals and farming dry and rainy season paddy, battles to achieve the Party’s duty of achieving three tons of paddy per hectare, battles to sort out the people’s standard of living, sort out preserved fish, clothing and so on,” all in order to “achieve the full potential for sorting out the living standards of members of cooperatives.”

Very soon after 17 April 1975, the CPK called for movement toward replacement of the remaining solidarity groups with village-wide cooperatives that it asserted would both enhance production and the political control of the poor and lower-middle peasantry. This was pursuant to a longer-range policy of increasing agricultural productivity by enlarging cooperatives and
having them absorb more and more of rural life into their collectivity. \(^{316}\) From at least September 1975, the Party began planning for further expanding and upgrading cooperatives and abolishing separate village and subdistrict committees, such that cooperatives organized at the village and eventually the subdistrict levels with up to 1,000 households would replace these separate state power organs and themselves be responsible for all grassroots functions. \(^{317}\) The envisaged results of this coming establishment of subdistrict-level and 1,000-household cooperatives were much discussed during the remainder of 1975. \(^{318}\) It was said that with these collectivities’ replacement of subdistrict administrations would come vastly improved popular living standards. These units would be “pleasant and attractive locales with clinics, schools, workshops, fertilizer factories, electricity and crèches.” \(^{319}\) As there were more than 1,000 subdistricts in the country, \(^{320}\) the planning envisaged that eventually there would be around that many cooperatives.

Solidarity groups continued to exist in some areas through January 1976, but after that, they were no longer mentioned in the official media. \(^{321}\) From the beginning of 1976, the establishment of village-level cooperatives was generalized, thereby expanding the number of families per cooperative. \(^{322}\) Separate village committees were dissolved, and their former cadre either incorporated into cooperative committees or made into cooperative cadre. “A fair number” of cooperatives were fast-tracked into covering whole subdistricts with cooperative committees that absorbed those of former subdistrict cadre. \(^{323}\) By September 1976, a considerable number of cooperatives were organized at the subdistrict level. \(^{324}\) All this was supposed to serve the vision that expanding and consolidating cooperatives would achieve a rapid heightening of paddy-growing productivity, which according to the original plans was to reach three tons per hectare per crop in 1976 and rise to four-five tons in 1977 and then six-seven tons in 1978. \(^{325}\)

As of September 1977, it was authoritatively claimed, implementation of the CPK project of heightening collectivization had advanced to the point that 50% of cooperatives comprised 700-1,000 households, 30% had 400-600 households and the 20% remainder 100-300 households, which it was said meant that in general, cooperatives had been upgraded to the subdistrict level. It was proclaimed this had succeeded in creating small collective societies “with all the facilities for livelihood, such as food, health services, culture and education.” \(^{326}\) This was also said to be the situation in March 1978.

In June 1978, the Ang Ta Saom Cooperative in Tram Kak District of Southwest Zone Sector 13 was presented to visiting foreign delegations as an exemplar of the ideal according to which the cooperative system was supposed to work. Its chairman, identified as a CPK member, stated that its population was 1,300, and that it cultivated 3,300 hectares of paddy fields and 500 hectares of orchards for fruit and other crops. He declared the rice yield was 3 tons per hectare, producing a surplus of 264 tons surplus, and that in addition to its communal eating hall, the cooperative had a hospital, a pharmaceutical centre, a school and a children’s centre. He said the cooperative was run via gatherings every three days to discuss matters relating to work and every ten days for criticism/self-criticism, to voice suggestions about how individuals could improve their implementation of the line, and resolution of “internal contradictions.” Visitors were also told that every ten days cooperative members had one day of respite from collective labour, on which they could tend gardens near their homes. \(^{328}\) In theory, these practices were in
line with the policy that “the masses of peasants” in the cooperative were supposed to “hold discussions to improve their working methods collectively.”

In July 1978, the CPK officially abolished the division of the cooperative population into full-rights, candidate and depositee categories, making “everybody … a cooperative member just like everybody else.” It declared this had been made possible by the successful expansion and development of cooperatives since April 1975. However, some members were more equal and others, as membership in the committees leading the cooperatives still required “a staunch revolutionary stand in terms of classness,” which meant committee persons still “must have good classness in class origins.” Criterion regarding previous political connections also remained in place, barring everyone who in the past had somehow been “beholden to the enemy” from becoming a cooperative leader. Thus, policy remained to select only people from the poor and lower middle peasantry – designated the “basic classes” -- to serve as the core of the leadership of cooperatives, because allowing “bad elements” to do so would lead to deviation from the Party line and failure to achieve production goals. Similarly, there is no indication of change from the previous policy according to which only the “progressive” persons selected from the basic classes were assigned to second-echelon leadership functions in the cooperatives, in charge of overseeing tasks “such as tending cattle and buffalo, planting crops and vegetables, taking care of granaries and warehouses, mending and keeping records of farm tools, cultivating rice, solving the water conservancy problems, providing medical services, caring for children, ensuring hygiene and sanitation, and so on.”

Finally, in late October 1978, the CPK announced a plan to begin upgrade existing cooperatives into “advanced cooperatives” or what it called “all-round developed cooperatives,” with the target of having 30% of the cooperatives advance to this level by 1980. It explained that to become advanced, a cooperative must be fulfilling or over-fulfilling paddy production targets, have “rice fields for crop planting in all seasons,” plus fruit and vegetable gardens around homes, spaces for raising animals and fish and workshops for all kinds of cottage industries. They must also become “advanced in sanitation” and be “equipped with a hospital staffed with revolutionary doctors who take care of the people at all times,” and also have “comfortable housing” and basic schools for literacy and numeracy.

**Villages, Subdistricts and Cooperative in Production and Defense: April-December 1975**

Meanwhile, from April 1975 to the end of that year, existing cooperative structures were tasked to cultivate paddy during the rainy season, and then, as the dry season began late in the year, to begin restructuring paddy fields by constructing new paddy field dikes in order to create conditions for further development of the cooperative system. This campaign continued until the beginning of the next rainy season, in around May 1976 in order to achieve the Party’s goal of a paddy yield of three tons per hectare per crop in the coming agricultural year. It was the cooperative’s job to deploy labour to the paddy-diking projects under the authority of a worksite chairman. Cooperatives were also supposed to set up “water command committees on every prong in order to be welded to the battlefield of water matters, putting water in and letting water out to accord with the concrete situation, when it rains heavily or there is no rain.” While such agricultural work had economic goals, the Party also reiterated wartime arguments by maintaining that the agricultural achievements to be expected from cooperatives’
success in carrying out “storming attacks to put up paddy dikes, dig canals and make dams.”³³⁸
would permanently finish off the feudal and bourgeois classes politically and firm up solidarity
among the people³³⁹ by ensuring that the whole population would support the collective system
the cooperatives embodied locally and unite against any enemy attempt to mobilize anyone
against the revolution, including the new people,³⁴⁰ as long as they were eating well.³⁴¹

At the same time, since 17 April 1975 and in the context of the influx of new people, the
cooperatives simply continued but expanded their wartime function of smashing persons they
deemed to be enemies. As the Party explained, before nation-wide liberation, “the cooperatives
were bastion foundations all over the place for the revolutionary war to liberate the nation and
the people. Since the liberation of the whole nation, each piece of land everywhere is a bastion
foundation. We are ever more powerfully consolidating cooperatives into iron ramparts.”
Ideally, cooperatives would be “strong” and thereby ensure “the country is strongly defended and
powerfully built up, making it impenetrable to the enemy.” As has been seen, the post-liberation
Party line enunciated that “all the types of contradiction are totally concentrated in the
cooperatives,” meaning that “severe class combat is concentrated in the cooperatives” in “daily
battles” making cooperatives politically the “hottest battlefield” of the socialist revolution.³⁴² To
ensure victory in those battles, cooperatives were under instructions to “more and more
strengthen their nature of being Party’s tool of proletarian dictatorship over all other classes.”³⁴³

Therefore, after April 1975, as before, the Party stressed that it was crucial to eliminate
enemies who might prevent the progress of cooperatives, organized at whatever level. Right
from 17 April, cooperatives were tasked with “smashing all criminal schemes prepared by US
imperialism” to reverse its defeat, and were thereafter congratulated for having done so by
ensuring that “the enemy was not able to carry out his activities, nor were the rebels capable of
eluding us to carry out espionage activities,” because such enemies and traitors were smashed by
the cooperatives. During the first year of the regime, they thus played an important role in
national defence, functioning “as a base for the attacks against the enemy in the political field,”³⁴⁴
being credited with continuing to contribute “greatly to the crushing of the enemy” and
thereby to the duty of defending the nation.³⁴⁵ In particular, in the context of integrating people
from Phnom Penh and various provincial capitals, cooperatives guaranteed that: “the enemy
could not conduct any activities. Bandits could not rear their heads or spies operate. The traitors
– the out-and-out lackeys of US imperialism – were tracked down, closely followed and done
away with in all their activities by our cooperative peasants whose hearts were filled with the
raging flames of class indignation and whose revolutionary vigilance was constantly
maintained.”³⁴⁶

In accordance with the previously-described CPK general line, cooperatives were, on the
one hand, where the new people’s social transformation was supposed to take place through an
overall reduction in class contradictions and of “original class substance”³⁴⁷ by “living, working,
studying, having good times, enjoying prosperity or enduring hunger collectively, in the
collectivity of the cooperatives”³⁴⁸ and enjoying “an equal standard of living” with base
people.³⁴⁹ On the other hand, the new people, unlike the veteran peasants, were generally not to
be allowed to have membership rights in the cooperatives, except for those of basic class
backgrounds.³⁵⁰ Such special cases aside, the newcomers were left in the depositee category and
would have to be “tempered in the movement in order to build up a revolutionary stance" before
advancing to eligibility for full-rights membership. Indeed, the Party line required it to conduct “severe ... class struggle” against their influence in cooperatives, which would be cockpits of the sharpest and most seething class conflict. To achieve this end, the Party was supposed to mobilize the people to join “most enthusiastically in making a revolution to smash the enemy,” and in particular get the “collectivists in the cooperatives” to conduct “concrete class struggles” against such enemies.

The Party’s stated concern in the months following April 1975 was that “enemy agents and various other bad elements” among the new people were a threat to the advance of the revolution meant that it instructed veteran peasants not only to take “charge of administering the education and re-fashioning of the ... people who have just been liberated from the rule of the contemptible traitors,” but also help suppress the “enemy agents and a variety of other no-good elements” among them. The Party also tasked cooperatives to “preserve and defend ... security” and “good order ... in the villages and sub-districts.” This was pursuant to general Party instructions to “absolutely not let the enemy insert their people to carry out espionage or sabotage or wreck” the revolution in the villages and sub-districts. Specifically, Party orders were to identify supposedly enemy-implanted networks of pacification agents, informers, saboteurs and commandos, then smash them as individuals in order to eradicate their organized activities.

1976

The role of cooperatives and the people in them in grassroots enemy suppression until their economic success won over virtually all of the population to the revolution was codified in the January 1976 DK Constitution, which proclaimed that cooperative peasants were duty-bound to defend the country. This was reflected in the February 1976 listing of military functions and among the six tasks of cooperatives, which were: 1.) to “mobilize the basic forces of the peasantry to conduct production work”; 2.) to organize the transport of materials and products needed and produced by the cooperatives; 3.) to “take care of the livelihood, culture, welfare and sanitation of the peasantry under their authority,” including by providing basic schooling and medical care; 4.) to manage barter and other trade among cooperatives; 5.) to “fulfill all military tasks relating to security” by “defending the revolutionary power” and otherwise “guaranteeing the existence cooperatives”; and 6.) to imbue the peasantry “living in the cooperatives with all lines prescribed by our revolutionary organization.” Another official formulation of the cooperatives’ military tasks explained they must meet “the requirements for insuring security, defending the revolutionary power of the state, the life and property of the people and the cooperative property as a contribution to the national defense effort.” This followed from the fact that the Party called on cooperative committees to carry out “each mission of the Party” and “each plan of the Party” for both production and defense, including to “fight on their own” to ensure defense of the revolution by using “the forces of the masses in the cooperatives to counter the enemy” there. Cooperatives were one of the levels of the Party which were instructed in late 1976 that they “should always consistently have mastery in advance” in taking action against internal enemies.
Cooperatives were to do this during 1977 while still being responsible for the organization and deployment of extra-village labour, which was sent to increasingly large-scale irrigation projects during the dry season and to maintain paddy fields during the rainy months, working as what were designated frontline economic forces. This was linked to the fact that at the beginning of 1977, cooperatives were tasked to double rice production over what was harvested during the 1976 agricultural year, primarily through the construction of dams, reservoirs and canals via this labour “mass movement.”

In the midst of these efforts, grassroots cadre were purged pursuant to the general concern the CPK had expressed since 1976 that some of them were deviating from the Party line by abusing their authority to live relatively comfortable lives while the ordinary population suffered hardship because of their bad leadership. The political cleansing that followed in 1977 included smashing of cooperative cadre accused of responsibility for previous failures to achieve agricultural production goals and therefore of being “dangerous elements attacking and wrecking the revolution.”

A particular CPK task for the second half of 1977 was to purge the ranks of cooperative cadre of such embedded enemies and also of non-poor and lower-middle peasant elements, including those related to cadre higher up, replacing them with the requisite good elements. The recommended means for effecting these purges was to whip up the poor and lower-middle peasantry within the cooperatives to attack enemies and elements bad class background, and then seize control of the cooperatives themselves. This was another aspect of the tasking of poor and lower-middle peasants to “defend the rear battlefield” pursuant to the Party’s military line. To this end, they were urged to “have class anger, do class combat, and have a firm class stance,” to realize that unless they have “class anger toward the class enemy and anyone making propaganda” against the revolution, and take measures against such persons, they would lose power and become victims of capitalist exploitation again. In the CPK view, cadre who had successfully passed through the screening were the Party’s hardest, strongest and best members, most capable of leading the masses to defend and build the country. Although the purges had initially reduced the total Party membership, resulting in concern that there were not enough cadre to do the required tasks, those purged were to be replaced on a one-to-one basis, while the CPK pursued plans according to which by the end of 1977, there should be 30 Party members per 1,000 family cooperative, assisted by 130 non-Party activists. New cadre recruited or promoted had to be very carefully vetted, and in particular their biographies carefully examined, not taken on faith, to ensure that no embedded enemies were appointed. On the basis of such background checks, they were to be chosen on class criteria, that is, drawn from the fundamental poor and lower-middle peasant classes. Those selected must also be politically clean, that is, “not indebted to or entangled with the enemy” to ensure that cooperatives “were strong at every spearhead, both the front and rear battlefields, and stuck to the plans.”

Meanwhile, with Sary alluding to the fact that cooperatives had the power to decide whether members should be killed, cooperatives continued officially to play “a big role in maintaining security and preserving order in the country” while expanding revolutionary power, and from the last quarter of 1977, there was greater emphasis on this role than ever, in line
with the general shift in CPK policy. The radio praised cooperative peasants anew for “constantly upholding their sense of revolutionary vigilance” and for “applying all necessary measures to defend” the country, declaring they had “never relaxed their vigilance or shown any sign of negligence which could provide opportunities to enemies of all stripes to commit acts of sabotage … or infiltrate us with their running-dog agents in order to create discord of falsely implement our party’s lines in our cooperatives.” It restated the Party maxim that such “revolutionary vigilance” was a prerequisite for fulfilling agricultural production goals. It called upon cooperatives to expand the system of collective agricultural production and also to defend it by not allowing “traitors of any stripes, the exploiting classes or enemies, big or small, near or far, to harm, downgrade or sabotage it,” praising them for having proved so consistently proved themselves able to “smash … traitors of all stripes” as part of their efforts to rapidly develop the country and thus fulfill and even over-fulfill the Party’s agricultural plans with a view to making Cambodia a “modern agricultural country.” The Party instructions in late 1977 stressed the necessity to “be vigilant about bad elements among the Party’s ranks, our ranks and the people who might divert the masses along a road different from the line of the Party” and to identify them by carrying out “examinations in the cooperatives” in order to “pre-emptively ambush the enemy.” Cooperatives had to sweep cleanly away more concealed enemies boring from within via “shock assaults” in order to not allow enemies in them to “strengthen and expand.”

In late 1977, cadre down to the cooperative level were told to be on guard against “opportunist and no-good elements” and again not to allow “non-proletarian” elements to have any authority, because “whenever there is a contradiction with the collectivist regime, these elements will engage in activities of opposition to the socialist regime.” “The problem of the people’s shortages of eating rice, drinking water and food supplies” in some places was prompting calls for a return to private practices, including eating at home. Cadre must counter this by explaining to the masses the advantages of eating in common. However, these weaknesses in the construction of socialism were also said to be happening because of the activities of no-good elements, who must be purged in order to bring about improvements in food production, in particular by preparing “conditions in advance for providing food supplies to the people” in 1978. If organizational measures in the form of purges were necessary, they should rely on the mass movement to carry out purges, in accordance with the Party line that “the mass movement decides.”

1978

From January 1978, in the wake of the large Vietnamese military incursion into eastern frontier areas of Cambodia in late 1977, the message was even more strongly convened in the context of renewed large-scale warfare, harking back to the pre-April 1975 period of armed conflict with the Khmer Republic. The CPK ideal was to motivate “in particular on the basic classes to sweep undercover enemies … cleanly away,” such that “in the process of continuing to sweep cleanly away the contemptible remnants one after the other, both those who oppose our revolution overtly and those who do so by covert means,” the Party would do so “by relying more and more solidly on the ordinary people, in particular the ordinary people of the basic classes, who see with more and more crystal clarity who is a friend and who is an enemy.” “Cooperative peasants” were therefore chief among “all the forces throughout the country”
intensely mobilized to contribute to a “peoples war” against the Vietnamese by struggling to “exterminate … the remnants of the enemy planted within” the cooperatives, to “eliminate all their activities from all of our cooperatives” and to “eliminate all traces of lax discipline both in the cooperatives and rice fields and in the crop gardens.” As part of the “collective worker-peasant masses,” they had to continue “the class struggle in a more vigorous and in-depth manner by trying to eliminate all enemy activities planted inside the country,” building on previous successes in having “eliminated the enemy stooges, continuously smashed and routed all dark schemes and successively countered and eliminated the spying, sabotage and subversion of enemies of all stripes.”

The aim was to further transform “the countryside into a strong revolutionary support base” for the war against the Vietnamese, thereby effectively joining “hands with the frontline” forces engaged in border combat. Achieving this required organizing “a systematic movement to provide defense” for villages and attaching “great importance to tracking down and smashing all criminal enemy” activities, above all those by any “Vietnamese-supporting element,” who “must be completely smashed and discarded from all our cooperatives and national community.” In this context, local guerillas were tasked to “fend off and eliminate the enemy’s pacification and espionage activities.”

All this was pursuant to the ongoing CPK prioritization of tasks which gave pride of place to an offensive to defend the revolution, while continuing to carry out socialist revolution to make Cambodia a “pure revolutionary socialist country” and developing “socialist construction … by leaps and bounds.” Cooperative peasants were therefore admonished not to see the latter as more important than the need to “struggle absolutely against the enemy,” a deviation from the CPK line constituting the error of “constructivism.” Nevertheless, policy also called for an extension of working hours to ensure achievement of economic targets, and warned that such things as “slack labour discipline” and “free and irresponsible speech” could “benefit the enemy.”

Throughout the first part of 1978, the Party warned that its programme for expansion of grassroots administrative organs was threatened by increasing activities by “enemies of all stripes,” including “subversive rumours and propaganda aimed at undermining solidarity and internal unity in the cooperatives,” propaganda that was “against the revolution and the socialist system.” It was also allegedly accompanied by enemy “attempts to breed corruption and immorality” in the cooperatives and “to destroy the common property of our cooperatives,” all as part of a plan to overthrow Communist rule. However, regime radio declared, the masses in the cooperatives had -- as before -- “detected” such activities by clearly distinguishing friends of the revolution from its foes and thereby foiled such maneuvers. Cooperatives were lauded for having “eliminated … enemy stooges.” This was pursuant to policies requiring cooperative members “to resolutely exterminate all agents of the expansionist, annexationist Vietnamese aggressors” and “all CIA agents” from their units “and from Cambodian territory forever,” and to do so pre-emptively in order to deal beforehand “with all poisonous maneuvers of the enemy” and to “strengthen and expand the dictatorship of the proletariat at all cooperatives.”

The Party called for an intensification of the search for “enemy running dogs of all colours planted within our cooperatives,” declaring that a previous failure of cooperative cadre to be aggressive enough in “weeding out enemy elements” and resulting lack of vigour in “the movement whipped up to wipe out the enemy within the cooperatives” was the reason
production targets had not been met, because “this allowed saboteurs to carry on their activities.” Cadre were admonished to “have a seething hatred for the enemy” and to “stay alert” in their “efforts to weed out and exterminate the enemy planted within the cooperatives.” Cooperative peasants were therefore pledged “to resolutely exterminate all agents of the expansionist, annexationist Vietnamese aggressors” and “all CIA agents” from their units “and from Cambodian territory forever,” and to do so pre-emptively in order to deal beforehand “with all poisonous maneuvers of the enemy” and to “strengthen and expand the dictatorship of the proletariat at all cooperatives.”

In fulfillment of this vow, as of mid-1978 enemy agents of all stripes attempting to “sabotage, subvert and undermine” the revolution were still being “detected and smashed by the iron net of our peasant cooperatives,” which were continuing to function as the “iron bulwark and firm foundation” of revolutionary power. It was in this context that the division of the people in cooperatives into full-rights, candidate and deposit members was formally abolished, a change which was said to have been made in part to reward the participation of people in the latter two categories alongside those in the first in the “great mass movement to defend the country” at the cooperative level, that is, in “the great mass movement to sweep cleanly away the concealed enemies boring from within who are CIA agents, Yuon running dogs and KGB agents.” Simultaneously, it was intended to encourage all of the Party’s “friends in the cooperatives” to “sweep out the concealed enemies boring from within ever more cleanly in accordance with the correct line of [the] Party” and, secondarily, “to impel forward the mass production movement.” Similarly, with regard to those otherwise deemed eligible to be cooperative committee persons, their most important qualification to lead cooperatives was their record of and capacity to carry out the “work of defending the country,” that is, “the absolute class struggle work of defending the country,” being most vigilant against “the stand, personality, spirit, disposition and activities opposing and attacking the Party.” Thus, while admonishing cooperative committee persons to maintain “solidarity with the absolute 95%-100% majority” of the people by winning “the trust, warm feelings, love and satisfaction of the masses,” the Party reiterated that their main tasks were to “carry out shock assaults … to sweep cleanly away the concealed enemies boring from within who are CIA agents, Yuon running dogs and KGB agents and carry out shock assaults to produce in the forms of paddy or various other crops,” in that order of importance. This was supposed to ensure that the future of cooperatives would be “ever brighter” and the future of Cambodia’s next generations would become “ever more illustrious with every passing day.”

The Party policy of giving ordinary people in cooperatives such a role in killings is affirmed in S21 cadre notebooks of late 1978, which record that if “there are in one cooperative undercover, burrowing enemies conducting activities causing us constant complications,” then “good cadre rely on the people to sort this out” by ensuring that “the people understand their duty of … defending the country.” As long as the people did, a notebook specified, “enemies and adversaries who dare to attack the revolution will be all gone: the people will smash them.” This coincided with the promulgation of the CPK plan to create advanced cooperatives starting in late 1978 explained that among their objectives was to ensure that “no enemy or obstacle” could obstruct the revolution’s advance by making the cooperative system an even stronger support base for it, which meant making advanced cooperatives units of struggle “to wipe out enemies of all stripes” and more rapidly improve popular living standards. The promotion of
the movement to create such cooperatives was thus accompanied by calls for a further heightening of revolutionary vigilance.  

Section Three: Policies for Districts

As stressed at the beginning of this review of CPK policies, the Party considered that the two crucial levels of authority for implementation of the Party line were Centre and district cadre. Districts were defined as an “important level” for the Party particularly because of the extent to which district committee members were bridge cadre linking cooperatives to the Party hierarchy. On the one hand, district cadre lived “side-by-side with the people.” On the other hand, Party Centre Committee members with responsibilities for matters outside the Centre were assigned to go down to the district level to disseminate and discuss Party plans and “in order to understand what the strong and weak points are and to study and draw lessons from what has been done right and what has been done wrong.”

General District Authority, Post-April 1975

Districts were generally responsible for the carrying out of the Party’s line of making socialist revolution, building socialism and defending the country, including all the Centre-articulated policies discussed so far and which were as applicable at the district level as in the grassroots. Districts had responsibilities “in every field,” including political work, ideological work, organizational work, force organization work and technical work. Like other echelons of the Party’s administrative hierarchy, districts were supposed to implement the Party line uniformly nation-wide, in districts small and big, the latter being defined as those having populations of 60,000-100,000 people. At the same time, district cadre were admonished not to simply wait for specific instructions from above about how to carry out their work, but to take the initiative in doing so, while also paying attention to being democratic in the running of their districts, not exclusively relying on the centralist side of democratic centralism in their leadership. Thus, district Party Committees were to grasp and exercise mastery with regard to all Party duties, while the entire Party “kept track of and pushed them” to do so.

One main post-war task of district Party committees was to ensure that labour power was fully utilized to carry out Party plans at the district level and from shortly after April 1975, CPK public media discussed the role of district committees in the construction of irrigation waterworks. This was pursuant to the priority given at this time to conducting a “revolutionary movement of rice farming, building paddy dike systems and digging feeder canals to sort out the water issue, that is, the construction in the worksites.” Insisting that the revolution’s proclaimed goals were achievable, the Party issued instructions aimed at district and other Party committees that Party members and cadres “must pay high-level attention and strive to sort out the living standards of the people in a timely manner with a high spirit of responsibility to the Party and the people,” arguing that “currently, we have many possibilities when compared to wartime,” and that the 1976 harvest should provide sufficient rice to ensure that “all the people … eat their fill.” It specified that in addition to growing paddy, cadre must also organize fishing and the production of fruit and vegetables. With regard to worksites, it
called for the construction of “appropriate houses and camps for them to sleep and rest in” during the upcoming rainy season. It demanded that there must be “orderly, correct, meticulous” organization of the population into work units for assignment to particular projects, and that mobilization of the population to carry them out must follow the Party line of combining organizational methods with persuasion.\textsuperscript{417}

In order to lead the 1976 paddy production drive, the Party mandated the setting up of special “Joint Command Committees” in which district cadre participated alongside sector and zone cadre. Agreement on plans among the zone, sector and district was supposed to ensure that districts would have no problem achieving the revolution’s objectives.\textsuperscript{418} By early 1976, mobile production units of hundreds or even one thousand-plus labourers were being deployed within districts to harvest 1975 paddy and rush irrigation projects to completion.\textsuperscript{419} Labour was mobilized at the district level to construct the new paddy field-level irrigation systems that were supposed to make possible high-productivity collectivized cultivation. Such so-called district main force production units continued to function over the following months, assigned “to go on offensives to put up new paddy dike systems and dig new feeder canals to sort out the water issue for production and go on the offensive to work the rice fields.”\textsuperscript{420} This entailed the mobilization of massed labour to work across sub-district and district boundaries on such agricultural tasks as transplanting and progressive expansion of irrigation projects.\textsuperscript{421}

As the 1976 rainy season paddy was being harvested late in the year, Pol Pot proclaimed that sufficient rice had been produced in a majority of the districts for them to implement the Party’s stipulated ration of an average of 13 thăng (one thăng = 24 kilograms) per person in 1977. Although he admitted some districts still had problems, he said these could be resolved with the help of sectors and zones.\textsuperscript{422} District cadre were admonished not to treat economic hardships as if they were normal and told they must take responsibility for resolving any difficulties.\textsuperscript{423} The Party drove home these points by praising some districts for over-fulfilling production targets while accusing others of deficiencies in their “stance of independence, mastery, self-reliance and creativity.” It insisted that as long as poorly-performing districts more fully internalized and more properly implemented the Party line, they could improve themselves and successfully sort out production and food supply problems, self-reliantly ensuring there was enough to eat during the upcoming year and beyond, albeit with the help of the sectors and the zones when necessary.\textsuperscript{424} The instructions for the second half of 1977 were that food deficit areas within districts were to be assisted by food surplus areas, and food deficit districts were to be assisted by surplus areas within the sectors of which they were a part.\textsuperscript{425}

In 1977, districts were therefore ordered to “go on offensives” in order to achieve and “even surpass” the Party’s economic plans, and to this end Party committees were required to lead “the masses on audacious offensives without hesitation, without pulling back, without indecision.”\textsuperscript{426} Labour was to be concentrated following the harvest of 1976 paddy to work “as fast as their arms and legs will go to build water reservoirs, dig canals and feeder canals, and put up paddy dikes to sort out water for rice farming and to pioneer on to complete mastery over water,” especially “in areas with fertile soil and soil where two crops can be grown.”\textsuperscript{427} With a view to increasing paddy production during the 1977 crop year, Party plans called on at least some districts to work with sectors to carry out irrigation projects providing hundreds of thousands or millions of cubic meters of water, mobilizing both district- and sector-level work
units. From April 1977, districts were to set up specific “command committees for water” tasked to “to achieve and master the successive plans for water construction projects,” which included the construction of “medium reservoirs.”

As for the districts’ other post-17 April 1975 responsibilities, in the field of social action each one was supposed to have a hospital, an office to produce medicines and child-care facilities. In the absence of sufficient “modern medications,” the Party called for the “large sufficient quantities of traditional medicines of every type to treat and maintain the health of our people.” Such medicines manufactured at the district level were supposed to treat a wide variety of diseases and maladies, including cholera, liver ailments, headaches, fevers, diarrhea, tetanus, swelling and “nervous conditions.” Districts were also tasked to ensure the sterility of medical instruments used in district hospitals. By 1976, districts were also called upon to contribute to national industrialization by establishing workshops. In 1977, these were supposed to be upgraded to “small factories” or even larger semi-industrial operations, such as for cement production, in the most heavily populated districts.

As regards defense, districts had their own army units, with some districts bordering on Vietnam eventually controlling a regiment of troops. From at least 1977, district army units in frontier areas were involved in fighting the Vietnamese. Their roles included smashing all the “activities” and “criminal maneuvers” attributed to the “Vietnamese enemy,” including fighting “people’s war” against invading Vietnamese armed forces. However, in line with Party policy, their main defense duties were with regard to internal enemies. Like other echelons of the Party leadership, district leadership committees were required to be “strong,” that is, to take “absolute and repeated measures” against enemies who were said to be undertaking activities “against the revolution in various forms.” In mid-1976, leadership committee members were instructed that there was a “continual struggle between revolution and counter-revolution” requiring them to maintain political mastery over the situation by conducting a class struggle against enemies who were stirring up “constant turmoil.” In September 1976, Pol Pot stressed the importance of district cadre having “mastery over the enemy,” and the Party Central Committee Secretary’s view was reinforced by follow-up late 1976 Party instructions requiring “mastery in advance.”

During 1977, districts were to ensure that “the great revolutionary movement of the masses tramples and crushes to bits any obstacle or enemy that impedes its path.” They were tasked to act as cores for mobilizing the “forces of the masses to do the assessing” necessary for “researching and finding embedded enemies boring holes from within” their territories, then also to be the cores for sweeping such purported enemies cleanly away. Good district cadre were supposed to do well at “seeing the enemies systematically, seeing each type of enemy network and what activities they carried out and how they were systematically organized,” thereby gaining “additional experience inside the movement,” including in “relying on the forces of the masses” to conduct this political cleansing. They were to join “in the mass movement to look for and attack enemies,” and the ideal was that they be “prescient when looking for enemy ploys,” thus demonstrating they understood how to conduct defense work, class struggle and refashioning at the cooperative level. Similarly, in 1978, the Party said that in order to be considered strong, district Party committees must be vigilant about no-good elements wherever they might be found and ensure the carrying out of pre-emptive attacks on the enemy within.
Relations of Districts with Grassroots, Post-17 April 1975

The CPK structure in a district with its members at that level and in subdistricts and villages were “interrelated with one another” and formed “and formed “a single system,” such that the political characteristics and practices of the lower levels down into the cooperatives were determined by those of the district, which decided the composition of subordinate bodies by choosing politically like-minded individuals to lead them as part of a process of district self-organization. As part of their function as a key level of the Party structure, district Party committees were required to “grasp the cooperatives” administratively, which meant grasping the biographies of cooperative committees and explaining to them “each mission of the Party, each plan of the Party,” with regard to both production and national defense lines. According to the Party Statute, district Party committees had to approve recruitment of Party members at the grassroots levels, in consultation with the relevant local Party branch and sector and zone Party committees. This procedure included recruitment of new Party members in the local armed forces at the subdistrict and village levels. Once enrolled, the performance of new grassroots Party members was to be monitored by branch, district and sector Party committees in order to determine whether they could be upgraded to full-rights Party membership. Party circulars tasked districts to conduct such recruitment and that of non-Party cadre, specifying quotas and stipulating persons to be recruited had to provide their biographies.

District Party organs were supposed to work with cooperatives to ensure the success of Party plans. Districts were to “monitor the movement and draw experience from the movement … all the way down to the cooperatives.” The Party declared that “districts that set their cooperatives up well” ensured that these cooperatives “were strong at every spearhead, both the front and rear battlefields, and stuck to the plans.” A good district Party Committee was said to be one which could lead the peasants in the cooperatives “go on the offensive to work the rice many fields quickly and get a good harvest,” annually improving yields. Districts were responsible for sorting out food problems at the sub-district level, in consultation with them, and also for ensuring that draught animals were kept healthy. As part of their duty to mobilize labour following the annual paddy harvest, district work brigades were supposed to act in coordination with cooperatives and local military units to get the population to construct irrigation works. Similarly, district army units were involved in the construction of cooperative headquarters, common dining halls, infirmaries and irrigation works.

District Party work also included examining cooperatives in order to sweep cleanly away allegedly concealed enemies boring from within, which was to be done pre-emptively via “shock assaults” to prevent enemy activities. The district was also responsible for taking action if branch Party secretaries below them were developing “in a bad way,” and this included purging cooperative cadre of embedded enemies and replacing them with good elements. Districts were responsible for such arrangements, and thus making themselves “quick on the attack to increase production.”

The Party insisted that in order to achieve its goals, its district-level cadre “absolutely must go down close to mass movements, for one thing to understand the movements, rectify the movements, and lead the movements, and moreover, to build their stance of increasing the leadership capacity of the Party to gradually be more solid and stronger.” The Party position
was that by joining “in the fray in the cooperatives,” they would “see the problems in the cooperatives … and resolve them in a timely manner; establish ties of sentimentality with the cooperatives; [and] have mastery over the enemy” there, where investigations were to be carried so the enemy could be pre-emptively eliminated, the importance of such attention to enemies being the point stressed by Pol Pot. Districts were supposed to receive weekly reports from below about “everything” that was going right and wrong.

**Purges of Districts**

From early 1976, district-level cadre were among those the Parry accused of “feudalist leadership,” of failing in their duties to increase productivity and production, of abusing their authority in order to enjoy a privileged standard of living, and of wrongly accusing the people of being the cause of problems which they themselves were creating. They were warned that they were thus at least indirectly serving the enemy, and that they must rectify their behavior or be responsible for the consequences. Ideally, such rectification was supposed to make district Party committees “be clean and follow the political, ideological, and organizational lines of the Party” under cadre whose behavior was reliably “good in class nature” and “militant,” who did not stay on the sidelines but got involved in the fight to achieve the Party’s goals, while respecting its discipline and being honest with it.

From the beginning of 1977, “a significant number” Party members in charge of districts were purged for supposedly failing to improve themselves and the situation and thus for allegedly being enemies embedded within the Party who had also built up traitorous networks of subordinates serving their traitorously non-Party policies, including by putting enemies or persons from classes other than the poor and lower-middle peasantry in control of cooperatives. Purge victims were accused of having stayed “in offices and only examined documents, reports and the mere back-and-forth correspondence in letters.” They allegedly “did not stick with the masses; they were controllist and would invite themselves to eat and drink all over the place.”

Some district cadre deemed to be good Party members participated in the purging of their erstwhile comrades, “relying on the forces of the masses” to do help them carry the purges out. This movement to “purge, clean up, sweep clean, strengthen, and expand” district Party committees was linked to orders that districts “go on offensives” to fulfill and over-fulfill Party production plans. It aimed to bring them up to the level of districts that were said to have previously waged “strong and profound class struggle” and “achieved the maximum paddy yields, kept sufficient rice seed, sorted out the livelihood of the people well, and supplied much to the state, too” and were now in a position to “surge forward and achieve the 1977 political mission to seize further huge, miraculous great leap victories in every field,” presumably including the internal defense duties with which districts were tasked.

In the context of such efforts during the second half of 1977 “to absolutely achieve three tons and six tons, to achieve attacking and cleaning out the enemy, and to absolutely build Party leadership,” the purged cadre were replaced via an ongoing selection of “good elements of one or two or more persons to increase leadership manpower” in the districts. As at other Party levels where purges necessitated replacements, they were supposed to be chosen on the basis of class and political criteria requiring they be of poor and lower-middle peasant origin and have no
connections to the Party’s enemies. It was stressed that being a good district cadre entailed being “good in terms of good class and having passed through successive revolutionary movements and having been tested in grasping and implementing the political, ideological, and organizational lines of the Party well, in particular having been tested by passing through both large and small obstacles well.” New cadre were to be drawn from “good locations that have no traitor elements,” which meant places deemed good sectors and districts and their subordinate base areas. They were to include cadre originally selected from “the mass movement,” that is from outside the Party, and then built up as “cores,” evaluated in terms of their performance, given additional responsibilities, and finally promoted into positions of district authority. The promotions were supposed to be made on the basis of “democratic centralism” and in consultation with the masses. The criteria were that they must “have engaged in labour right alongside the labourers, right in the mass movement, right in production.” They must also have “joined in the mass movement to look for and attack enemies” and to be ready to “attack bureaucratism, mandarinism, [and] authoritarianism” within the Party. They were promised that if they proved themselves “strong cadre” according to Party requirements for defense and production work, they would be rewarded by further promotion to posts at the sector, zone and even Centre levels.

The Party continued to focus on district level cadre construction into late 1977 and a replacement process supposed to go on into 1978, amidst on-going Party complaints that there remained weak district Committees that were not achieving production plans. It declared that all such districts must be improved, explaining “improving here means purging those places where there are bad elements.” There were further assessments of districts to attack enemies at that level. Thus, as part of the Party’s plans to expand and revamp the local revolutionary leadership in order to “make revolutionary movement be strong in 1977-78 and create the conditions to push the movement to become even stronger starting in 1979,” the purging of district-level cadre was to extend into 1978. It can be concludes that such measures had as main goal ensuring CPK policies on class and vis-à-vis enemies were implemented by district authorities, their subordinates in the grassroots and the whole of the population there, veteran people, and new people and the supposedly undivided people brought about as a result of the Party’s mid-1978 proclamation of the abolition of the categories of full-rights, candidates and depositees in the cooperatives.
Notes

2 Ibid., pp.39-41.
3 Ibid., pp.42-43.
4 Ibid., p.50.
5 Ibid., pp.86-87.
6 Ibid., p.44.
7 Ibid., p.52.
8 Ibid., p.54.
9 Ibid., p.108.
10 Ibid., pp.95-96,100.
11 Ibid., p.43.
12 Ibid., pp.50-53.
13 Ibid., p.53.
18 E1/25.1 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Trial Chamber – Trial Day 13 Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC 11/01/2012, p.17 (Khmer).
19 E1/22.1 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Trial Chamber – Trial Day 10 Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC 14/12/2011, p.7 (Khmer).
20 E1/36.1 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Trial Chamber – Trial Day 24 Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC 31/01/2012, p.13 (Khmer).
23 Hone Proletarian Ideology to Make It Most Sharp and Strong (dated by content to September 1976), p.10.
25 “The Work of Strengthening and Improving the Standpoint of and Attitude toward Leading and Doing the Party’s Re-education Work,” Revolutionary Flags (Special Issue: September-October 1972), reprint of December 1972, p.3.
26 Ibid., pp.7-8.
27 Ibid., pp.8-10.
28 Ibid., p.61.
29 “Cadre, Party Members, the People and the Revolutionary Army Must Unite with the Party in Its Assessment and Evaluation of the Situation in Order to Fulfill Their New Duty of Winning Great Leap Victories,” Revolutionary Flags (Number 8: August 1975), pp.2-4.
“The Work of Strengthening and Improving the Standpoint of and Attitude toward Leading and Doing the Party’s Re-education Work,” Revolutionary Flags (Special Issue: September-October 1972), reprint of December 1972, p.79.

Ibid., pp.63-64.

Ibid., p.65.


“Cadre, Party Members, the People and the Revolutionary Army Must Unite with the Party in Its Assessment and Evaluation of the Situation in Order to Fulfill Their New Duty of Winning Great Leap Victories,” Revolutionary Flags (Number 8: August 1975), pp.12-14.

“The Work of Strengthening and Improving the Standpoint of and Attitude toward Leading and Doing the Party’s Re-education Work,” Revolutionary Youth (Special Number: August-September 1974), pp.3-5.


Ibid., pp.7-8,14-15.

Ibid., pp.5-6.

Ibid., pp.11-12.

“Building and Strengthening the Party in accordance with a Number of Marxist-Leninist Concepts,” pp.4-5.


“Cadre, Party Members, the People and the Revolutionary Army Must Unite with the Party in Its Assessment and Evaluation of the Situation in Order to Fulfill Their New Duty of Winning Great Leap Victories,” Revolutionary Flags (Number 8: August 1975), pp.12-14 (Khmer).


“Eliminate Wrong Pride and Build Up Pride in Serving the People Most Graciously and With All One’s Heart and Soul,” Revolutionary Youth (Special Number: August-September 1974), pp.3-4.

“Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism,” Revolutionary Youth (Special Number: August-September 1974, p.14

Ibid., pp.16-19.

Ibid., pp.19-21.

DK Notebook KNH 071 in the DCCam collection. A marginal annotation to these notes appears to attribute the substance to a special number of Revolutionary Flags. Dated by context.


Ibid., pp.22-24.

Ibid., pp.24-26.

Ibid., pp.26-30.

Ibid., pp.30-31.

Ibid., pp.31-32.

DK Notebook KNH 069 in the DCCam collection. Dated by context to late 1972.

DK notebook KNH 0010 in the DCCam collection, entries from late 1972-early 1973; DK Notebook KNH 071 in the DCCam collection, entry dated January 1974; DK Notebook KNH 071 in the DCCam collection. A marginal annotation to these notes appears to attribute the substance to a special number of Revolutionary Flags.

DK Notebook in the DCCam collection KNH 069. Dated by context to late 1972.

E1/17.1 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Trial Chamber – Trial Day 5 Case No. 02/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC 06/12/2011, p.15 (Khmer).


E1/24.1 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Trial Chamber – Trial Day 12 Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC 10/01/2012, pp.31-33 (Khmer).

E1/17.1 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Trial Chamber – Trial Day 5 Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC 06/12/2011, p.11 (Khmer).

E1/17.1 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Trial Chamber – Trial Day 5 Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC 06/12/2011, p.11 (Khmer).

98 “Cambodian Youth Must Temper and Re-Fashion Themselves in the Movement to Strengthen and Expand Production Cooperatives,” Revolutionary Youth (Number 10: October 1975), pp.5-8.
100 “Slogans for Mid-1976,” Revolutionary Flags (Number 7: July 1976), pp.2-3.
102 “How Must Revolutionary Youth Re-Fashion Themselves in This New Phase of the Revolution?,” Revolutionary Youth (Number 12, December 1975), pp.6-7.
103 DK Notebook KNH 001 in the DCCam collection. Entry dated by context to the latter half of 1975.
105 “Convened a Study Session 14 November 1975, Sisowath School.”
109 “Strengthen the Stance of Fighting to Sort Out Popular Living Standards,” Revolutionary Flags (Special Number: October-November 1975), p.45.
111 “Cambodian Youth Must Temper and Re-Fashion Themselves in the Movement to Strengthen and Expand Production Cooperatives,” Revolutionary Youth (Number 10, October 1975), pp.4-7.
112 “Strengthen the Stance of Fighting to Sort Out Popular Living Standards,” Revolutionary Flags (Special Number: October-November 1975), p.45.
113 “Revolutionary Youth Must Personally Go Down into the Fray to Help Sort Out Popular Living Standards,” Revolutionary Youth (Number 11: November 1975), p.3
114 “Completely Eliminate Individual and Personal Property and Powerfully Strengthen and Expand Collective Property,” Revolutionary Youth (Number 11: November 1975), pp.18-19
116 “Convened a Study Session 14 November 1975, Sisowath School.”
118 Notebook of S21 interrogator Pon, entry dated 21 December 1977.
119 DK Notebook KNH 069 in the DCCam collection. Dated by context to late 1972.
120 DK Notebook KNH 001 in the DCCam collection. Dated by context to the latter half of 1975.
121 “Convened a Study Session 14 November 1975, Sisowath School.”
122 “Eliminate Ideologies of Individual and Personal Property, So That They Are Cleaned Out Once and for All,” Revolutionary Youth (Number 7: July 1975), p.28.
123 “Long Live the Phenomenal Revolutionary Army of the Communist Party of Kampuchea,” Revolutionary Flags (Number 8: August 1975), pp.58-61. The speaker is identified as the Chairman of the Supreme Military Committee of the Party, known to be Pol Pot.
124 DK Notebook KNH 001 in the DCCam collection. Dated by context to the latter half of 1975.
125 “Revolutionary Youth Must Always Constantly Raise High the Spirit of Revolutionary Vigilance in Order to Forever Defend Independence, Territorial Integrity and Democracy in Cambodia,” Revolutionary Youth (Number 8: August 1975), p.13.
127 “Revolutionary Youth Must Always Constantly Raise High the Spirit of Revolutionary Vigilance in Order to Forever Defend Independence, Territorial Integrity and Democracy in Cambodia,” Revolutionary Youth (Number 8: August 1975), p.7.
130 “Convened a Study Session 14 November 1975, Sisowath School.”
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